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Abstract:
Formulations of quantum mechanics can be characterized as realistic, operationalist, or a
combination of the two. In this paper a realistic theory is defined as describing a closed
system entirely by means of entities and concepts pertaining to the system. An operationalist
theory, on the other hand, requires in addition entities external to the system. A realistic
formulation comprises an ontology, the set of (mathematical) entities that describe the
system, and assertions, the set of correct statements (predictions) the theory makes about the
objects in the ontology. Classical mechanics is the prime example of a realistic physical theory.
A straightforward generalization of classical mechanics to quantum mechanics is hampered by
the inconsistency of quantum properties with classical logic, a circumstance that was noted
many years ago by Birkhoff and von Neumann. The present realistic formulation of the
histories approach originally introduced by Griffiths, which we call ‘Compatible Quantum
Theory (CQT)’, consists of a ’microscopic’ part (MIQM), which applies to a closed quantum
system of any size, and a ’macroscopic’ part (MAQM), which requires the participation of a
large (ideally, an infinite) system. The first (MIQM) can be fully formulated based solely on
the assumption of a Hilbert space ontology and the noncontextuality of probability values,
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relying in an essential way on Gleason’s theorem and on an application to dynamics due in
large part to Nistico. Thus, the present formulation, in contrast to earlier ones, derives the
Born probability formulas and the consistency (decoherence) conditions for frameworks. The
microscopic theory does not, however, possess a unique corpus of assertions, but rather a
multiplicity of contextual truths (‘c-truths’), each one associated with a different framework.
This circumstance leads us to consider the microscopic theory to be physically indeterminate
and therefore incomplete, though logically coherent. The completion of the theory requires a
macroscopic mechanism for selecting a physical framework, which is part of the macroscopic
theory (MAQM). The selection of a physical framework involves the breaking of the
microscopic ‘framework symmetry’, which can proceed either phenomenologically as in the
standard quantum measurement theory, or more fundamentally by considering the quantum
system under study to be a subsystem of a macroscopic quantum system. The Decoherent
Histories formulation of Gell-Mann and Hartle, as well as that of Omne`s, are theories of this
fundamental type, where the physical framework is selected by a coarse-graining procedure in
which the physical phenomenon of decoherence plays an essential role. Various well-known
interpretations of quantum mechanics are described from the perspective of CQT. Detailed
definitions and proofs are presented in the appendices.)
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I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
It is nearly 90 years since the mathematical formalism of nonrelativistic quantum mechan-
ics (hereafter QM) was created and there have been essentially no revisions to the present
day. Yet there remains significant controversy regarding the physical ‘interpretation’ of the
theory, specifically the meaning of the wave function or quantum state. There is even con-
troversy as to whether QM requires an interpretation! (Fuchs and Peres, 2000; Van Kampen,
2008). This situation, in which what is arguably the most successful theory in all of science
is still a subject of debate as to its basic meaning, is unprecedented in modern science.
The present paper agrees with those who say that QM requires no interpretation. Instead
it requires a proper formulation that specifies the assumptions of the theory and its relation-
ship to physical systems and their properties. There are, however, two types of foundational
questions regarding QM:
• Is QM the ‘whole truth’, with respect to experimental consequences?
• If so, what is the best formulation of QM?
These two questions are often confounded in discussions of quantum foundations, but we
would like to distinguish them. If the answer to the first question is ‘no’, then all formulations
of QM are doomed, by definition. It has become customary, however, to include in the list
of formulations some that are based on the answer ‘no,’ i.e. revisions of the physical content
of QM that are motivated by the difficulty of proper formulations of the existing theory.
The most popular example is the class of ‘spontaneous collapse’ formulations, see e.g. Adler
and Bassi (2009). Unless otherwise stated we shall assume the answer ‘yes’ to the first
question, always leaving open the possibility that experiment will rule otherwise, in which
case a different theory will be sought. This paper is devoted almost exclusively to the second
question.
Formulations of QM can be broadly divided into two classes, which we shall refer to
as ‘realistic’ and ‘operationalist’. We define a theory to be realistic if for a system S it is
formulated entirely in terms of entities and concepts referring to S itself. An operationalist
formulation, on the other hand, requires, in addition to S, entities external to S such as
‘observers’, ‘measurement apparatus’, or ‘agents’, for a full specification. There are also
theories that are partly realistic and partly operationalist, in that some properties are defined
in terms of S and some in terms of external entities.
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For a realistic formulation we shall distinguish two parts, the ‘ontology’ and the ‘asser-
tions’. The ontology, represented in the formalism by mathematical entities, comprises the
list of objects or properties that characterize the system under study. They are what the
theory is ‘about’. We shall sometimes refer to the objects in the ontology, following Bell
(2004), as the ‘beables’ (or existables) of the theory. The assertions are the set of correct
mathematical or physical statements (predictions) that are made by the theory, regarding
the beables. Note that the concept of truth is inextricably linked to the assertions.
An operationalist formulation, of which the Bohr (or ‘Copenhagen’) version of QM is the
prime example, requires a dividing line (a ‘cut’) between the system S and the outside and a
separate characterization of the outside. In a totally operationalist theory the term ontology
is inappropriate for the properties of the unobserved system, since these properties are not
what the predictions (assertions) are about.
Note that we use the terms realism and operationalism exclusively to characterize for-
mulations of physical theories, not as descriptions of a philosophical point of view. In this
restricted sense, the terms are well defined. As explained below, on the other hand, ‘real-
ity’ and ‘real’, referring to beables or their properties, are terms whose meaning is much
more obscure and we shall avoid their use altogether. We recommend this practice in all
discussions of the foundations of QM.
The present paper focusses on the nonrelativistic case with Euclidean space-time, since
most of the traditional questions and paradoxes of QM already appear in that limit. As
emphasized by earlier authors, however, the histories approach generalizes naturally to the
relativistic case, including general relativity with more complicated space-time geometries.
This is in contrast to some other formulations of QM (see below).
The aim of the present paper is to provide a realistic formulation of QM, paying careful
attention to basic philosophical issues and to precise use of language. In the interest of
clarity, we are led to redefine certain terms, as compared to their standard usage. We
summarize our definitions in Appendix E.
Section II presents a formulation of classical mechanics, which serves as a model for a re-
alistic theory, in a form designed to permit generalization to the quantum case. Section III,
entitled “The Basic Conundrum of Quantum Mechanics”, explains why this generalization
is not straightforward. Section IV, the core of the paper, is a realistic formulation of QM
which we call ‘Compatible Quantum Theory (CQT)’. It is a reformulation of the Consis-
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tent and Decoherent Histories theories introduced by Griffiths (1984), Gell-Mann and Hartle
(1993) and Omne`s (1992). Although there is no contradiction with these earlier theories, the
point of view and language differ somewhat, whence the (slightly) different name we give to
our version. The two principal ways in which CQT differs from the earlier approaches are
(i) an essential distinction is introduced between the microscopic (MIQM) and macroscopic
(MAQM) theories, and (ii) in the microscopic theory the Born formulas and consistency
(decoherence) conditions are derived rather than posited, assuming only the Hilbert space
ontology and the noncontextuality of probability values. Section V discusses the main alter-
native formulations of QM, seen through the lens of CQT. Detailed mathematical definitions
and proofs are presented in the appendixes.
II. CLASSICAL MECHANICS
Classical mechanics provides the prime example of a realistic formulation of a physical
theory.
A. Standard Formulation
In its simplest but nevertheless general form, nonrelativistic classical mechanics begins
with a phase space as a 6N -dimensional Euclidean space representing the positions and
momenta of a system of N particles or 3N degrees of freedom. The system under study is
represented by a point x in the phase space, with ‘initial’ value x0 at t = t0. Then according
to classical mechanics there is a unique trajectory x(t) going through x0 at t = t0, for all
times t < t0 or t > t0. This trajectory can in principle be calculated from Newton’s laws of
motion once the forces are known, and any property of the system can be determined from
x(t).
The above is a complete formulation of classical mechanics for a deterministic system, by
which we mean a system for which a specific value of the initial system point x0 has been
assumed. In the stochastic case (statistical mechanics) we replace the initial system point
by an ensemble of points xi with a probability distribution at t = t0 such that∫
ρ(x, t0)dx = 1, (1)
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where the integral extends over all the points in the ensemble. Then the time evolution
of the probability distribution ρ(x, t) is obtained from the Liouville equation, which is the
generalization of Newton’s laws to the stochastic case. Properties of the system can be
obtained at any time by averaging over x with weight ρ(x, t). The Liouville equation ensures
that (1) will remain true if any other time t is substituted for t0.
B. Reformulation in Terms of Set Theory and Logic
For the purpose of generalization to QM it is useful to rephrase the previous formulation
in the language of set theory and logic, see e.g. Bub (1999). A brief outline of the necessary
mathematical background is presented in Appendix A.
Ontology
The ontology of the theory is represented by the elements of phase space, which consist
of system points and system properties. We shall refer to the system point, somewhat
loosely, as the state of the system, or sometimes more carefully, as the representative point
of the state. A property is represented by any (Borel) subset of phase space. Under the
operations of union, intersection, and complementation, these subsets form a Boolean lattice
(see Appendix A).
Assertions
As mentioned earlier, the assertions are the set of true statements (predictions) that the
theory makes about the elements of the ontology. We shall say that a system ‘has’ the
property A if the representative point for its state is contained in the subset of phase space
specified by A. Thus a state x defines a truth function Tx(A) on the properties of the system,
which selects out of all possible properties (i.e., Borel subsets of phase space) of the system,
those that contain the representative point of the state. This truth function can be written
as
Tx(A) = T(True) if x ∈ A, (2)
Tx(A) = F(False) if x /∈ A. (3)
All classical properties are determinate with respect to any state: they are either true
(contain the state) or false (do not contain the state). We can thus say that the state is the
‘source of truth’ for any system property. The truth values then satisfy all the requirements
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of classical logic (see Appendix A).
Determinism
Classical mechanics is deterministic, in that if the state is known exactly at some time,
any property is exactly determined at any later time to be either true or false. There
are, however, two important qualifications to this determinism. The first is the well-known
phenomenon of chaos, namely that in order to determine a property with an accuracy α at
time t > 0, one would in general have to know the state at time t = 0 with an accuracy
αexp(−βt), where β is a time constant characteristic of the system. Thus in practice the
predictions are almost always approximate.
The second qualification is less often discussed but no less important. Classical mechanics
does not tell you ‘what happens’: all predictions of properties are contingent upon (‘relative
to’ or ‘contextual to’) an assumed state at some ‘initial time’, but the theory does not tell
us what that initial state is. By definition the state is declared to be ‘true’ at some time
(technically, the set containing only this state is ‘true’) and the assertions are the set of
other true propositions that follow from this assumption. We shall see below that QM in its
CQT formulation retains the contextuality with respect to the assumed truth of the initial
state and it adds the contextuality of frameworks.
Statistical Mechanics
In the stochastic case we assume an initial probability distribution ρ(x, t0), which governs
the choice of the state x and which generates a well-defined probability function on the
properties,
Pρ(A, t) =
∫
x∈A
ρ(x, t)dx, (4)
where the quantity ρ(x, t) evolves in time according to the classical laws governing x(t). In
Appendix A, Kolmogorov’s set-theoretic formulation of probability theory is presented and
shown to be closely related to classical logic. It follows that the probability function Pρ can
be thought of as a distributed truth function obtained by combining strict truth functions
Tx according to the weights given by ρ(x). In the probabilistic case it is statements about
Pρ that are the assertions of the theory.
In this connection we may say that the function ρ represents the state; this requires
us to say that in the deterministic case the state is represented not strictly by the system
point x, but by the characteristic function of the set {x}, if the system points are discrete -
otherwise, by a delta function. This shift anticipates the shift, in quantum mechanics, from
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a pure state |ψ〉 to a mixed state ρ, in Section IVB. In the general case we can say that the
state ρ is the source of probability for the system.
Measurements and state preparation
It is not traditional to discuss measurements in formulations of classical mechanics, not
because measurements are considered unimportant, but because they are thought to be
unproblematic. In order to verify or test the predictions of the theory, the system in question
is coupled to some measurement apparatus (if the original definition of the system does not
contain any apparatus) and the ‘pointer readings’ on the apparatus are correlated with the
properties of the original system. One either assumes that the effects of the apparatus on
the system are negligible, or that they can be calculated and subtracted out to determine
the ‘true’ behavior of the uncoupled system.
Similarly, the designation of a particular element of phase space as the ‘state of the
system’ can be realized by a physical action analogous to a measurement, whereby the state
in question is ‘prepared’ and selected. Carrying out and describing such a procedure in
practice may not be easy but there are no problems of principle.
Microscopic and macroscopic theories
The formulation of classical mechanics described above represents what we refer to as a
microscopic theory, namely one that applies to a system of any size. Measurements, to be
sure, involve macroscopic devices capable of recording the truth value of the property they
are designed to measure, but in classical mechanics the necessary addition to the microscopic
theory does not involve any new concepts in order to deal with such devices, so there is no
need for a special auxiliary theory for this purpose. The classical theory is thus physically
complete. In the quantum world, however, we will see that the choice of a measurement
has an influence on what statements can be correctly made about the system under study;
this gives the measurement process a special character that differs from its role in classical
mechanics. We shall thus exclude measurements from the quantum mechanical microscopic
theory we develop, which then implies that the latter theory is physically incomplete, and it
will need to be augmented by a macroscopic theory that can deal with the special character
of measurement.
Classical mechanics also illustrates the point made earlier about the terms ‘reality’ and
‘real’. One could simply say that any element of the ontology is real, but this includes
elements that are true as well as elements that are false, or elements that are indeterminate
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Beables (existables)
Assumables Predictables
Hamiltonian            State                    Properties
         [defines system]              (x,ρ)                          (indeterminate)
phase space
 State Properties
(determinate assertions)
True False
ONTOLOGY
ASSERTIONS
FIG. 1 Schematic representation of classical mechanics. The top row describes the ontology (or
beables), which consists of a Hamiltonian as well as states and properties. A state can be either
a point x in phase space (pure) or a probability function ρ (mixed). Properties are subspaces of
phase space and their truth values remain indeterminate as long as a state has not been assumed.
The bottom row describes the assertions, which consist of truth values that the state (the source
of truth) confers on properties.
in case no initial state has been designated as true. We prefer to avoid the use of ‘real’ and
‘reality’ altogether in this context. The terms ‘realism’ and ‘realistic’, on the other hand,
have a well-defined meaning (see Section I) when referring to the formulation of a theory.
The above microscopic formulation of classical mechanics is illustrated schematically in
Fig. 1.
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III. THE BASIC CONUNDRUM OF QUANTUM MECHANICS
Before presenting our formulation of QM, we highlight what we consider the essential
difficulty in passing from classical to quantum mechanics. This is what we call the ‘fun-
damental conundrum of quantum mechanics’ and it can be illustrated by considering an
isolated spin-½ degree of freedom. Let us consider the statement “The value of Sx is + ½”
and write it as
[Sx+] = T, (5)
i.e. the property Sx+ is true. Similarly, we can write [Si+]= T or [Si+]= F for any spin
component Si. Such statements about the truth of a property, just like the corresponding
ones in classical mechanics, are meant to refer to an intrinsic attribute of the quantum
system, and they are thus part of the microscopic theory.
Now Nature tells us (or so it appears) that an essential experimental fact about quantum
spins is that Si is either +½ or −½ but not both, and it can have no other value. We can
therefore write, in particular,
[Si+] OR [Si−] ≡ T. (6)
To be concrete, we mean that a Stern-Gerlach machine oriented along the i-axis will (apart
from experimental imperfection) send the particle either in the i+ or in the i− direction.
We claim that Nature also tells us
[Si±] AND [Sj±] ≡ F, (7)
for any i, j such that Si and Sj are not collinear. This does not seem obvious, as a pair
of Stern-Gerlach measurements, first along i and then along j, may well give affirmative
results for both Si+ and Sj+. Nevertheless, we may interpret [Si+] AND [Sj+] concretely
as meaning that the spin-½ system can be prepared so that a single Stern-Gerlach measure-
ment of one of i+ and j+ will give an affirmative result no matter which measurement is
chosen. This is certainly not true according to experience. Thus (repeating the argument
for [Si+] AND [Sj−], etc.) we have (7).
Let us assume, then, that i, j are not collinear. According to the distributive law of logic,
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Eq. (A.4e) of Appendix A, written with AND/OR instead of ∧,∨], we would have
([Si+]OR[Si−]) AND ([Sj+]OR[Sj−]) = (8)
([Si+]AND[Sj+]) OR ([Si−]AND[Sj+]) OR ([Si+]AND[Sj−]) OR ([Si−]AND[Sj−]).
The above equation states that if either [Si+] or [Si−] is true and either [Sj+] or [Sj−] is true,
then one of the pairs ([Si±], [Sj±]) must be true. But the left-hand side of (8) is true since the
propositions in parentheses are true by (6), whereas the right-hand side is false since each
proposition in the parentheses is false by (7). Having ‘proved’ that T = F, we must therefore
conclude that the ‘essential experimental fact about quantum mechanics’ mentioned above
defies logic! Every realistic formulation of quantum mechanics is some way of coming to
terms with this fundamental conundrum.
An operationalist does not encounter the conundrum, since he does not consider that
closed quantum systems ‘have’ intrinsic properties, without specifying an external mea-
surement or agent. Thus both (6) and (7) are rejected in an operationalist formulation.
Among the most common realistic formulations of quantum mechanics there are three pos-
sible choices.
(a) What we will call the ‘classical’ choice is to consider states corresponding to the different
directions of S to be the separate members of a ray-ontology considered as a classical set.
This choice denies the ‘eigenstate-eigenvalue link’ for quantum variables and thus invalidates
(6).
(b) The Consistent Histories formulation of Griffiths (2002) declares that propositions such
as those appearing in (7), involving the combination of ‘incompatible propositions’, are
meaningless; thus Eq. (7) is discarded and the contradiction is avoided.
(c) There is, however, a third way, namely to let both (6) and (7) stand and to deny the
distributive law (A.4e). This is the choice made by Birkhoff and von Neumann (1936), which
they termed ‘quantum logic’. As explained below, we shall be influenced by this choice in
approaching the formulation of quantum mechanics, though we shall not in fact embrace it,
and we end up instead with the essential elements of Consistent Histories.
2. Quantum logic?
It is essential to understand that the difficulty in choice (c) is not simply a formal one,
as though the distributive law in logic were an arcane rule that could be brushed aside.
Anyone can see, without referring to (8), that there is no way of assigning truth values to
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[Si+], [Si−], [Sj+], and [Sj−] without violating at least one instance of (6) or (7). Therefore
the disease that needs curing has to do with the assignment of truth values to propositions.
One’s first tendency is to suggest that truth values should be made ‘fuzzy’ or dispersive,
thus abandoning either one or both of Aristotle’s ‘Law of Contradiction’ (an entity cannot
both have and not have the same property) and his ‘Law of Excluded Middle’ (an entity
either has a property or fails to have it). Again, however, these are not just scholarly dicta
but express the starting point of rational thought as it has been understood through the
ages. A mind that persists in violating one of these two laws even in the presence of the
most careful clarification is considered irrational.
A different cure has been attempted by Putnam (1969), in which auxiliary propositions
are introduced which satisfy the laws of logic when the original ones do not. This road
has been eventually modified or abandoned by Putnam himself, see Putnam (1981), or the
review by Maudlin in (Ben-Menahem, 2005), but it has been pursued by other authors, e.g.
(Bacciagaluppi, 2009).
We are inclined to think that the disease stems from the very concept of a ‘proposition’,
and so we are moved to examine the extent to which logic can be carried out without
propositions, and thereby without truth values. We will conclude that without truth values
there is no logic, since truth and falsehood are necessary in order to define logical propositions
that make contact with physics. We thus consider the designation ‘quantum logic’ (Birkhoff
and von Neumann, 1936) to be misleading, and we shall continue to use the term ‘logic’
exclusively to denote classical logic. However, we will arrive at logic in two distinct steps: the
first following Birkhoff and von Neumann, to see how far one can go without the distributive
law, and the second by adding this law in a way that avoids contradictions. We are aware
of the broader definitions of logic in mathematics and philosophy, see, e.g. Garson (2009),
but for the purpose of making contact with physics we equate logic with classical (i.e.
Aristotelian) logic.
3. Doing without truth values
The propositions we are concerned with assert that the actual condition of a system -
that is, the one determined by the state at a given time - has or does not have a particular
property. Thus the state may be regarded as the subject of any proposition, and each
property, represented mathematically by a projection operator, as the predicate of that
proposition. Now if all predicates are considered in relation to some fixed subject, they can
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be combined by the usual logical operations without mentioning the subject. We understand
perfectly what is meant by ‘is a man and is mortal’, by ‘is a man or is mortal’, and by ‘is not
a man’, without reference to the subject of these phrases. Moreover, predicates combined
in this way obey the usual axioms of propositional calculus (see Eq. (A.4) in Appendix A),
regardless of one’s choice of the fixed subject. This ‘property calculus’ mirrors the abstract
features of propositional calculus, but as long as the fixed subject (the state) has not been
specified, the predicates are not propositions and do not have truth values.
Going back to the three choices (a, b, c), we shall follow choice (c) in taking subspaces of
Hilbert space to be properties which may violate the distributive law, but shall not associate
truth values with them as is done in (6) and (7). When we finally combine the properties
with states we shall do so in a way that avoids contradiction, by associating truth values
only to the properties within appropriate collections of properties, in which the distributive
law is preserved. These collections will turn out to be the Griffiths ‘frameworks’, so that we
wind up closest to choice (b).
IV. COMPATIBLE QUANTUM THEORY (CQT)
We call our formulation of quantum mechanics ‘Compatible Quantum Theory (CQT)’, a
designation intended to suggest that it is a version of ‘Consistent Quantum Theory’ (Grif-
fiths, 2002), also abbreviated CQT, and often referred to as the ‘Consistent (or Decoherent)
Histories’ approach (Gell-Mann and Hartle (1993); Griffiths (1984); and Omne`s (1992); see
also Hohenberg (2010)) . There are, however, distinctions between our formulation and
previous ones. We first provide a fully realistic formulation which is applicable to an arbi-
trary closed quantum system. This is what we call the ‘microscopic theory’ (MIQM). We
find, however, that this theory is physically indeterminate and therefore incomplete, in that
it has no unique set of physical assertions. In order to complete the theory we require a
macroscopic framework selection mechanism, which can be either ‘external’ or ‘internal’ (see
below). This mechanism is described by the macroscopic theory (MAQM). We stress that
Compatible Quantum Theory does not contradict the tenets of the earlier histories formu-
lations, but it employs a somewhat different language intended to clarify and justify the
arguments and to relate the history formulations of QM more closely to other formulations.
Note also that in our usage the terms ‘microscopic’ and ‘macroscopic’ are not meant to
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distinguish between small and large systems. Instead, the microscopic theory applies to any
system regardless of size, whereas the macroscopic theory requires a large (ideally infinite)
system to define certain concepts used.
A. Hilbert Space Ontology
The starting assumption of CQT is what we call the Hilbert Space Ontology : the theory is
based on properties and states, each of which has a formal representation in the Hilbert space.
The properties are subspaces of Hilbert space and their associated projection operators.
A state will be represented provisionally by a ray of vectors (later called a pure state).
Ultimately, the ray will be replaced by a unit-trace self-adjoint positive operator called a
density matrix.
Given these definitions we can create a ‘property calculus’ by introducing the q-operations
applicable to arbitrary properties (see Appendix B):
A ∧q B = Intersection(A,B) = A (q-and) B, (9a)
A ∨q B = Span(A,B) = A (q-or) B, (9b)
A˜q = ¬qA = Orthogonal Complement(A) = (q-not) A, (9c)
where the span of two subspaces is the set of all vectors obtained by linear combinations of
vectors in the two subspaces, and the orthogonal complement of a subspace is the set of all
vectors orthogonal to every vector in that subspace.
As discussed in Appendix B, the subspaces of Hilbert space form a lattice, which is closed
under the operations (9) of the property calculus. For a given Hilbert space H we denote
the lattice of all of its properties (subspaces) by LH. The all-important difference from the
classical case is that this lattice is non-Boolean, in that it does not satisfy the distributive
law. That is, in general
A ∧q (B ∨q C) 6= (A ∧q B) ∨q (A ∧q C), (10)
a feature that is at the root of the ‘quantum conundrum’ of Sec. III. This failure will have
dire consequences for our formulation of the assertions of CQT.
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B. The search for quantum assertions: static frameworks
So far we are not considering any dynamics, i.e. the state and the properties are all
defined at the same time. This is what we call the ‘static theory’. In attempting to find
a set of assertions for static QM, we first note that according to what was stated in Sec.
III above, we shall think of properties (subspaces of Hilbert space) as predicates, and the
state as the subject, of logical or probabilistic statements. Also, because of the non-Boolean
nature of the lattice of quantum properties, it is not possible to define logic universally
over LH, i.e. to satisfy the truth table relations (A.5) simultaneously for all pairs {A,B}
of properties drawn from LH. This is why we do not favor the term quantum logic for the
operations in Eqs.(9). We prefer the term ‘property calculus’. For a Boolean lattice, on the
other hand (one satisfying the distributive law), the q-operations (9) are equivalent to the
operations (A.3) that lead to the standard relations (A.4) of classical logic.
We now ask whether one can find a truth function T (A), defined over all of LH, but
required to satisfy the truth table relations only for pairs {A,B} that belong to the same
Boolean sublattice. Such a function, uniquely defined over all of LH, is said to be noncontex-
tual. It turns out that this is impossible for a Hilbert space with dimension D ≥ 3, as first
shown by Bell (1966). A striking counterexample was given independently by Kochen and
Specker (1967), and a simpler one for D ≥ 4 was found by Mermin (1990). These results
are often referred to as ‘no-go theorems’.
We therefore turn to probability, and follow Griffiths (2002) in taking the term ‘proba-
bility function’ in the classical sense as referring to a sample space – that is, a classical set
whose subsets, called ‘events’, are the arguments of the probability function (see Appendix
A). An essential concept in constructing probability functions for QM is that of compatible
properties. Denoting by [A] the projection operator associated with the property (subspace)
A, we say that two properties A and B are compatible iff [A] and [B] commute. Since there
is a one to one correspondence between subspaces and their associated projection operators,
we shall freely refer to properties in terms of either concept. We also use the terms ‘subspace’
and ‘property’ interchangeably.
Let us call a sublattice L internally compatible if all of its properties are compatible
with one another. On the other hand, we call two lattices of subspaces mutually compatible
if each subspace of one is compatible with each subspace of the other. The two notions
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are independent; in particular, one can easily construct two mutually compatible lattices,
neither of which is internally compatible. We shall use the simpler term ‘compatible’ for
either notion if we think the meaning is clear.
As explained more fully in Appendix B, the definition of a probability function of quantum
properties begins by defining a sample space S as any set of subspaces of Hilbert space that
are mutually orthogonal (each vector of one is orthogonal to each vector of the other) and
complete (they span the full Hilbert space H). Next, we define the all-important concept
of a (static) framework, ES , as the so-called closure of the sample space, namely the set of
subspaces obtained from S by linear combinations of its projectors with coefficients 0 and
1. In Appendix B we show that a framework is both an algebra of projection operators and
a Boolean lattice of subspaces. Following Griffiths we sometimes refer to the framework ES
as an ‘event algebra’, to its properties as ‘events’, and to the members of the sample space
S as ‘elementary’ events or properties (also known as ‘atoms’) of the framework. When we
wish to call attention to the framework as a lattice we shall use the notation LS , but this is
the same object as ES . Note that a given property can be an event in different incompatible
frameworks, since it can be obtained from a variety of different sample spaces by algebraic
closure (see Appendix B).
To construct a probability function we thus consider a sample space S and the associated
framework ES = LS obtained by lattice closure. We then need only assign to each member
of S (i.e., each atom of LS) a real nonnegative probability so that the sum over all the atoms
is 1. The probability of any set of atoms, i.e. of any event, is then the sum of the individual
atomic probabilities, as given in (A.8). This probability function is closely tied to the chosen
framework; we say that it is contextual to that framework, and denote it as PS or PES or
PE .
It is here that we shall diverge somewhat from the point of view of Griffiths. Like him, we
require that the theory be formulated without reference to empirical findings. He, however,
introduces the Born rule as a fundamental precept of the theory, whereas we wish to derive
it from another principle. Our starting principle will be that the theory must conform to
classical logic as far as possible, given the Hilbert space ontology. Since truth values cannot
be assigned to all properties simultaneously because of no-go theorems (see Bell (1966) and
Kochen and Specker (1967)), we do the next-best thing by requiring that probability values
be assigned simultaneously to all properties - in other words, that probability values, unlike
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truth values, be noncontextual. The remainder of this section will be devoted to showing
that this can be done only if the probability values satisfy the Born rule.
We do not wish to depart from the principle that a probability function can be defined
only within a particular static framework. For this reason we used the term ‘probability
value’ at the end of the previous paragraph. By noncontextuality of probability values we
mean that the value of a probability function in one framework is equal to that of a different
probability function defined in a different framework when both functions are evaluated for
the same property, if that property belongs to both frameworks. This would seem obviously
true if we were working with a classical system, and we postulate that it is still true in
quantum physics, namely that given two mutually incompatible frameworks E and E ′ with
at least one property A in common, the probability functions PE and P ′E ′ satisfy the relation
PE(A) = P ′E ′(A), ∀ A ∈ E ∩ E ′. (11)
A lengthy argument presented in Appendix B demonstrates that if ρ is any unit-trace
nonnegative operator (such an operator is called a density matrix ), then noncontextual
probability values can be found for the full lattice LH of quantum properties, based on the
normalized lattice measure
Wρ(A) = Tr(ρ[A]). (12)
The probability function Pρ,E associated with the framework E can be defined as the restric-
tion of Wρ to that framework, considered as a sublattice of LH:
Pρ,E(A) =Wρ(A) = Tr(ρ[A]), for A ∈ E . (13)
It is easily verified that the function Pρ,E defined by Eq.(13) satisfies the Kolmogorov re-
lations (A.8),(A.9), which imply the crucial ‘overlap equation’ (A.10), for all properties
belonging to the framework E . It is thus appropriate to refer to Pρ,E as a probability func-
tion. The noncontextuality of probability values then follows immediately since such values
are all derived from a single measure Wρ defined over the whole lattice LH.
Gleason’s theorem is the highly nontrivial statement that in a Hilbert space with dimen-
sion > 2, any normalized lattice measure on the lattice LH has the form (12), for some
density matrix ρ. We take (12) and (13) as consequences of Gleason’s Theorem, rather than
postulating them from the outset.
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From the above argument it follows that we must generalize the assumption of Sec.A
above that states are represented by rays of vectors, and assume that they are represented
by density matrices ρ, otherwise known as ‘mixed states’. A ray |ψ〉 then corresponds to
the special case of a ‘pure state’, where ρ has a single nonzero eigenvalue and is given by
ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ|. The analogue of the classical statement in Sec. II.B above, that the state x is
the ‘source of truth’ for properties, is the quantum statement that a pure state |ψ〉 defines
a property through its projector [ψ] = |ψ〉〈ψ|, whose probability is 1, i.e. a true property.
Substituting |ψ〉〈ψ| for ρ in (13), we obtain the pure-state Born formula
PE(A) =Wψ(A) = 〈ψ|[A]|ψ〉, forA ∈ E . (14)
We thus see that in QM the state (mixed or pure) is in general the ‘source of probability’,
and for pure states it is the source of truth and falsehood for some properties and the source
of probability for others.
In Griffiths’s presentations, the Born rule is considered to be fundamental, and the fact
that it is noncontextual is a byproduct. In establishing the microscopic theory of CQT as
a deductive system, we take the noncontextuality of probabilities as a first principle and
the microscopic Born rule (13) is then derived by the use of Gleason’s Theorem, for some
density matrix ρ. Similar arguments have been put forward by other authors in the past,
e.g. Cassinello and Sa´nchez-Go´mez (1996).
As stated above, a quantum property A is associated with a subspace of the Hilbert
space, or equivalently with the projection operator [A] onto that subspace. The state ρ
confers an intrinsic noncontextual probability value on A via the Born rule (13). In many
formulations of QM (e.g. David (2012), Sec. 4.2.1), what we have called a property is
referred to as ‘an ideal projective measurement’, since it has a probability value associated
with it. We consider this language misleading and we shall reserve the term ‘measurement’
for macroscopic (irreversible) operations employing a classical measuring device (see below).
Let us now consider probability from an intuitive point of view. As discussed in Appendix
A, when we think of probability we necessarily think of truth and truth values. We think
that the probability of a proposition is the likelihood (in some sense) of its being true. How
far can this intuition be maintained in CQT? The answer is given by the ‘Single Framework
Rule’ of Griffiths, which we restate as follows:
a) With respect to truth values, they are in general (that is apart from special properties
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having ψ as eigenvector) unknowable, but if they are postulated to exist then one must not
assume that a property belonging to two incompatible frameworks has the same truth value
in both.
b) With respect to probabilities, the probability value assigned to a property is independent
of framework (assuming a fixed state), but a full probability function can be defined only
within a single framework.
In our formulation, the single framework rule applies to propositions concerning the truth
or falsehood of a property, or concerning probability functions and their domains. These
can only be combined by logical connectives drawn from the same framework: they are
contextual. Propositions about the value of a probability function applied to a property, on
the other hand, are able to transcend the barrier separating one framework from another:
they are noncontextual.
As emphasized by Griffiths, the existence of mutually incompatible frameworks is the
single most salient feature of the microscopic theory that distinguishes quantum mechanics
from classical mechanics. Before exploring its consequences we shall expand the treatment
to take into account the time dependence of quantum states and/or properties.
C. Generalization to dynamics: families and frameworks
1. Extension from static theory: histories and families
In the static description given in the previous subsection, a framework is a complete
compatible (Boolean) sublattice of LH. It can be regarded as an interrogation, and a basis
element (one of the members of the sample space that generate the sublattice) can be
regarded as one of a complete set of mutually exclusive answers to the interrogation. In
CQT the interrogation is not a measurement but a proposed point of view, represented by a
projector, in which the system must have one of the elementary properties corresponding to
the basis elements, also known as atoms of the sublattice (these need not be one-dimensional
subspaces). We may say that this is the elementary property selected to be ‘true’ provided
that we remember that ‘truth’ is contextual to the particular framework.
In the dynamic description, a property is generalized to a history, and a static framework
is generalized to what we shall call a family or candidate framework. A family is generated
by its elementary histories, defined as follows: At each of N times t1, ...tN , a one-time
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sample space is identified, having mn members. The sample space at time tn is the set
{An} = {A1n, ..., Amnn }. These N one-time sample spaces (we may call them static event
spaces) determine the family FN . The elementary histories of the family are sequences of
N one-time properties, in which at time tn the projector A
jn
n has been selected from the
set {An}. A particular elementary history is defined by the indices j1, ..., jN , and can be
notated as
CjN = (A
j1
1 , A
j2
2 , ..., A
jN
N ), (15)
where the superscript j on the left side stands for the sequence j1, ..., jN . If all the mn
(jn runs from 1 to mn) are finite, the number of elementary histories is Π
N
nmn. (We are
assuming no branch dependence, see end of Appendix C.1.)
We also introduce the dynamic event space of the family FN . It is generated from
its elementary members (i.e., the elementary histories) by linear combination in the way
described in Appendix C.1. This produces 2Π
N
n mn dynamic events in all, of which ΠNnmn
are elementary events and one is the ‘zero’ event. The dynamic events are subspaces in the
tensor space HN , made up of N copies of H, not subspaces in H.
An important concept is that of a homogeneous event (Isham et al., 1994). Among
dynamic events of FN , the homogeneous ones are those that can be written as histories
CN = (B1, B2, ..., BN) (16)
where each Bn is a static event at time tn - that is, [Bn] is some linear combination of the
members of {[An]}, with coefficients 1 or 0. All elementary events are clearly homogeneous,
but the converse is not so because Bn is not necessarily elementary in the static event space
at time tn. There are Πn2
mn = 2Σnmn homogeneous events, but only Πnmn elementary ones.
But there are in general many inhomogeneous events since the number of dynamic events
is 2Πnmn . We shall call any homogeneous event a history, but inhomogeneous events will be
called history complexes.
To review the terminology introduced above: an elementary history is the same as an
elementary event, but the meaning of ‘elementary’ depends on the prior identification of
a family to which the history/event belongs. On the other hand, homogeneous events are
histories and inhomogeneous events are history complexes; the meaning of the terms ‘history’
and ‘history complex’ is independent of any family containing the object.
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As explained below and more fully in Appendix C.4, only families whose members obey
an additional consistency or decoherence condition, dependent on the state, lead to a proper
definition of probability and thus lead to frameworks.
2. Physical time development between interrogation times
As mentioned above, members of FN can also be considered to be subspaces in the tensor
product Hilbert space HN , where the elementary histories such as (15) form a history sample
space. That is, they are all mutually orthogonal and together they span HN . Being mutually
orthogonal, they are mutually compatible and therefore FN is internally compatible as well
as complete, as a sublattice of LHN .
We will say that two elementary histories having the same projection times t1, ..., tN are
(mutually) compatible if for each n the nth property of one history is compatible with the
nth property of the other. Then by construction all the elementary histories of the family
are mutually compatible. But this means that the elementary histories are all mutually
compatible as subspaces in HN . From this it follows that all the histories and history
complexes - that is, all dynamic events - in the family are mutually compatible as subspaces
in HN .
Repeating the reasoning developed in Appendix B.4 for static events, we can define
probability functions PN(CN) applicable to all histories and history complexes, that is to all
dynamic events, in the family FN , considered as subspaces of HN . Such a function satisfies
the relation analogous to (B.20)
PN(CN ∨q C ′N ∨q C ′′N + ...) = PN(CN) + PN(C ′N) + PN(C ′′N) + ...., (17)
where the q-operations on the lhs of (17) refer to the property calculus relevant to HN .
If, however, we wish to relate the probabilities of histories to the state, as was done in
the static case, then we must take into account the time development of the state, and
must change our perspective from regarding the successive bases {A1}, {A2}, ..., {AN} as
belonging to separate copies of H, to seeing them as existing together in the same Hilbert
space, so that the relationship of An to An+1 in the same history can be treated algebraically.
For this purpose it will be helpful to think of a history CN as built up step by step out of
its initial subhistories C1, C2,...,CN−1, rather than coming into being all at once. This is
accomplished by introducing the Heisenberg projectors
A¯n ≡ U(tn, t0)−1[An]U(tn, t0), (18)
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where
U(t, t′) = exp[−iH(t− t′)], (19)
(H is the Hamiltonian), as well as the chain operator
CˆN = A¯N A¯N−1...A¯2A¯1, (20)
an operator in H, in contrast to CN , which generates an operator in HN .
3. Probabilities and the Born rule
In order to generalize the Born rule to histories we first note that since [A] is a self-adjoint
projection operator, the linear relation (13) in the static case can be rewritten as
Pρ,E(A) = Tr(ρ[A]†[A]) for A ∈ E . (21)
In the dynamic case it is the quadratic relation, Eq.(21), that provides the generalization of
the probability formula: specifically, given the pure state |ψ0〉 at t = t0, Griffiths’s rule for
the probability of an elementary history is
Pψ0,E(CN) = 〈ψ0|Cˆ†N CˆN |ψ0〉 for CN ∈ E . (22)
Here again, this quadratic expression was simply postulated by Griffiths as a natural general-
ization of the Born rule (14). We would like instead to derive it from Gleason’s Theorem and
a noncontextuality argument, as we did in the static case. The trouble is that CˆN , though
an operator on H, is not a projector, and Gleason’s Theorem involves a linear function on
projectors, Eq.(12). Following Nistico` (1999), this obstacle is overcome by considering the
conditional probabilities that take us from Cn to Cn+1. By requiring that these conditional
probabilities themselves be noncontextual, one can express them in terms of probability
measures on single projectors and so apply Gleason’s Theorem. An argument of some com-
plexity developed in Appendix C.3 then leads to the conclusion that (22) is indeed the only
possible probability formula. In particular, competing formulas such as that of Goldstein
and Page (1995),
Pψ0(CN) = Re〈ψ0|CˆN |ψ0〉, (23)
are ruled out.
We note that our argument does not involve any generalization of Gleason’s theorem
itself, only a varied application of the original theorem, sometimes to probability measures
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onH and sometimes on HN . In contrast, Isham et al. (1994) prove a new theorem applicable
directly to histories. Although the proof of that theorem requires an impressive amount of
care and ingenuity and the result may have significant value for some purposes, the theorem
yields, for our purposes, a result weaker than the one derived in our Appendix C, in that to
obtain our result Isham et al. (1994) would need to assume that probabilities are given by
a quadratic expression of the form D(CN , C†N), where D(CN , C ′†N) is a bilinear functional
on two histories called a ‘decoherence functional’, and only then, using their theorem, could
they deduce that this functional must be such as to yield Eq. (22) for the probabilities.
Something similar may be said of Sorkin (1994), who shows that classical and quantum
mechanics arise from the first and second, respectively, of a hierarchy of elegantly connected
equations that may be postulated to relate the probabilities of histories. Sorkin shows
that the second of these equations, applied to Hilbert space, implies (22), and also that
this equation is equivalent to the assumption that probabilities arise from a decoherence
functional. But he provides no justification for the decoherence functional assumption itself.
Thus, within the scope of the present paper, the argument for (22) given in Sorkin (1994)
is no stronger than that of Isham et al. (1994).
On the other hand, it should be said that the above remarks do not do justice to the
far-reaching vision of either Sorkin or Isham et al., both of which seek generalizations of
nonrelativistic QM that go beyond the scope of Hilbert space or even of a description in
terms of Euclidean space-time. The same can be said for the program of Gell-Mann and
Hartle.
4. Families, frameworks and the consistency conditions
In the static case any orthogonal decomposition of the identity yields a Boolean sublattice
and consequently a framework. For dynamics, on the other hand, although we were able
to derive Eq.(22) and rule out Eq.(23), it turns out that an additional condition must be
imposed in order to avoid contradictions. Specifically, consider a history belonging to two
different families. Then, as demonstrated in Appendix C.4, by requiring the noncontextu-
ality of probability values for such histories, we are led to a necessary consistency condition
Re(D(CN , C ′N)) = Re(〈ψ0|Cˆ ′†N CˆN |ψ0〉) = 0, (24)
where CˆN , Cˆ
′
N refer to any two distinct elementary histories in the family, and D(CN , C ′N)
is the ‘decoherence functional’ whose diagonal value is given in (22). Equation (24) is called
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the weak decoherence condition.
One may easily suspect that this condition, involving only the real part of the decoher-
ence functional, lacks robustness in some respect, so that it should be replaced by medium
decoherence
D(CN , C ′N) = 〈ψ0|Cˆ ′†N CˆN |ψ0〉 = 0. (25)
Such a suspicion may account for the preference that Griffiths (2002) expresses for medium
decoherence.
In fact, Diosi (2004) has justified this suspicion in a convincing way by considering a
system consisting of two subsystems with no entanglement between them, so that the deco-
herence functional of the whole system is a product of ‘partial decoherence functionals’ of
the two subsystems. Then medium decoherence of the full decoherence functional implies
medium decoherence of the partial decoherence functionals, but the same does not hold for
weak decoherence since Re(D1) Re(D2) is not the same as Re(D1D2). We shall therefore
consider medium decoherence (25) to be the applicable consistency condition.
It is important to remember that the consistency conditions involve the state ρ or ψ,
in addition to the family. We will call a pair E = (ψ,FN), consisting of a state and a
family a candidate framework, and one whose elementary histories satisfy Eq.(25), simply
a framework (we continue to use the notation E for frameworks in the dynamic case, since
they still constitute an event algebra). Then the Single Framework Rule discussed at the end
of the previous subsection holds when histories are substituted for properties. Note that in
the static case families are replaced by Boolean sublattices and every ‘candidate framework’
satisfies the consistency conditions, so the distinction between candidate framework and
framework was unnecessary. The noncontextuality of static probability values, on the other
hand, only holds for a fixed state. Thus if we think of a static framework as also including
both the state and the Boolean sublattice, then the noncontextuality of static probability
values refers to conditional probabilities, conditioned upon the state.
Another important point is that single-time histories (N = 1) can be shown (Appendix
C.3) to be directly mapped onto the static theory, so they automatically satisfy the con-
sistency condition (25) for any state ψ or ρ, even though they involve two times, t = t0 at
which the state is defined and t = t1 at which the probabilities are evaluated. This means
that the simpler static theory, without the need for consistency conditions, is actually of
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great relevance in practice, since single-time histories cover the most common applications
of QM.
5. Two-slit diffraction
One familiar application of the consistency conditions is seen in two-slit diffraction. Sup-
pose that at time t0 a particle is in a superposition of two states, one pertaining to the
right-hand slit and the other to the left-hand slit. At t1 a decomposition of the identity
is imposed, in which one projector selects the right-hand slit and the other the left-hand
slit. At t2 the particle reaches the interference zone, and a new decomposition is chosen in
which different projectors select different points in the zone. One then finds two elementary
histories CN , C
′
N , both selecting the same point x at time t2, but making different selections
(right or left) at t1. One can also construct a history, C
′′
N say, by adding together the two
projectors (not their probabilities) at t1. This history belongs to the family under consid-
eration but it is not an elementary member of it. Nevertheless (see Appendix C.4) there is
good reason to apply to it the formula (22). This application yields the correct probability
for the particle to pass through the point x at time t2, that is, the probability according to
the interference pattern. This probability contradicts the one calculated by addition from
the separate (right and left) probabilities, and so the consistency condition is not satisfied;
the family containing CN , C
′
N and C
′′
N is not a framework. The contradiction is easily traced
to the failure of (24). In fact the histories CN and C
′
N can be shown to be what are termed
‘intrinsically inconsistent histories’ in Subsection 11.8 of Griffiths (2002).
The above discussion should not be taken to mean that the two-slit experiment does not
admit a description in CQT. For the simplest two-slit experiment the appropriate framework
contains the history C ′′N , but not the other two histories. In order to discuss the probability
of passage through one or the other of the two slits, the physical setup considered must be
more elaborate than the one considered up to now: either the state at t1 is not a coherent
superposition, or additional degrees of freedom (e.g. the flip of a spin) must be added to
the system at the slits, to mark the passage of the particle at t2. In that case one can define
different (incompatible) frameworks, one to describe the passage through the slits and the
other to describe the interference pattern.
6. The work of Chisholm, Sudarshan and Jordan
As elucidated in a little known paper by Chisolm et al. (1996), the consistency conditions
put severe restrictions on many-time frameworks, so that by far the majority of imaginable
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families are ruled out. This may give the impression that the CQT description of Nature is
not rich enough to be interesting. The results of Chishom et al., however, may be put in
better perspective by reexamining the static case discussed in Subsection B above.
A static description has two components: the state and the sample space of properties
(subspaces). The two need have no relation to each other; any state can be combined
with any sample space. However, the sample space itself is severely restricted in that its
members form a complete orthogonal decomposition of the identity. This means that if a set
of subspaces of H is chosen at random, it is almost surely not an admissible sample space.
Yet this ‘impoverishment’ is only what we expect when we seek a domain of interrogation
within which one can operate with classical logic and define classical probability functions.
Necessarily, the richness of quantum physics will not appear in a single domain of this kind,
but will be lodged in the availability of multiple domains each of which is a classical sample
space by itself, but which are not compatible with one another. When both the state and the
sample space have been specified, the nontrivial Born probabilities emerge from the degree
of mismatch between the two.
Now consider a family of histories of length N = 1. We have a sample space imposed at
t1, preceded at t0 by an ’initial state’. As mentioned above, this situation is mathematically
equivalent to the static situation (see Appendix C.3, second paragraph) and leads to the
same Born probabilities.
If N = 2, one can construct inconsistent families such as exemplified in the double slit
experiment, where the initial state is assigned to time t0. If N = 3, the inconsistency
can be lodged in the projections chosen at t1, t2, t3 so that it is independent of the initial
state. What Chisholm et al. show is that all inconsistencies at multiple times are due to
the occurrence of this ‘double slit configuration’ at some triplet of times not necessarily
consecutive. To put it baldly, one cannot evade quantum incompatibility by distributing
the inconsistent information through multiple times. But this fact is already understood,
and it arises from Nature itself, not from a limitation of CQT.
The result of Chisholm et al. amounts to the statement that a framework with medium
decoherence must consist of two parts and no more. (We pass over the more complicated
result for weak decoherence.) The earlier part consists of projection operators compatible
with the state. The later part consists of projection operators compatible with the final
projections at tN . A framework must not contain a projector at an intermediate time that is
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compatible neither with what precedes it nor with what follows it. Such a projector would
activate the double-slit inconsistency. Thus the consideration of many times does not make
the world of frameworks essentially richer than it is in the static case, except in the following
respects:
(a) The transition from ‘earlier’ to ‘later’ may take place at different times in different parts
of the Hilbert space.
(b) Within one part, if one allows projectors to be more than 1-dimensional, there can be
unlimited topological complexity due to successive refinements and coarsenings, provided
that there exists a maximal refinement (not necessarily present at any one time) that is a
refinement of all the projectors at various times in that part.
(c) This picture is not essentially altered by branch dependence.
We see, therefore, that CQT does not attempt to evade or do away with quantum in-
compatibility, any more than it attempts to do away with the ‘fundamental conundrum’
discussed in Section III for a single time. These are features of the quantum world. CQT
spells out just how far we can go in applying classical thought to a world possessing these
features, using the Hilbert space ontology.
D. c-assertions and ‘physical’ assertions
We view the above theory as the full microscopic formulation of QM with its multiplic-
ity of frameworks, within each of which the theory makes assertions about probabilities
and permits the supposition of mostly unknown c-truths, not constant across incompatible
frameworks, where the prefix c is meant to signify ‘contextual’. This theory has been sum-
marized by Griffiths (2011b) with the slogan Liberty, Equality, Incompatibility! to highlight
the presence of incompatible frameworks of equal status and the freedom to choose among
them. We refer to this freedom as ‘microscopic framework symmetry’. It is important to
note at this stage that the microscopic theory does not possess a unique concept of truth
which we might refer to as ‘physical’ truth. It is simply not part of the theory. We thus
consider the microscopic theory to be physically indeterminate and hence incomplete, even
though it is logically coherent.
In order to arrive at a notion of physical truth we must therefore find a mechanism for se-
lecting a physical framework from the set of equivalent frameworks of the microscopic theory,
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a process that necessarily involves macroscopic concepts. Every so-called ‘interpretation’ of
quantum mechanics corresponds in some sense to a different physical selection mechanism.
We shall discuss these in the next section, but we can already anticipate that depending on
the physical situation or on the question asked, the answer might not be unique.
As mentioned earlier, in distinguishing between the ‘microscopic’ and ‘macroscopic’ the-
ories we do not mean the difference between small systems (with few degrees of freedom)
and large (ideally infinite) systems. Instead, the microscopic theory applies to all systems,
large and small, whereas the macroscopic theory requires the system to be large in order to
define certain concepts, e.g. measurement.
E. Framework Selection Mechanisms
In discussing framework selection mechanisms we shall distinguish between what we call
‘external mechanisms’, involving coupling the system S to another physical system external
to it, and ‘internal mechanisms’ that seek to identify special physical frameworks describing
selected properties of the system S itself. The distinction reminds one of the difference
between operationalist and realistic formulations of the theory, but it is different: here both
mechanisms are being discussed within the realistic formulation we call CQT, whereas in
the operationalist (Copenhagen) view, measurements are what lends ‘reality’ to properties.
1. External Mechanisms
Here we are dealing with a phenomenological approach since it posits the existence of a
classical measurement apparatus without inquiring into its physical origin. The standard
textbook approach (see, e.g. Landau and Lifshitz (1965)) was initiated by von Neumann
(1932, 1996). Our description follows that of Griffiths (2002) and Omne`s (1999). We consider
the system S and couple it to a (classical) apparatus M, which is often accompanied by an
environment E, representing ‘the rest of the world’.
Let us consider the measurement of a physical quantity (an observable) represented by the
Hermitian operator Aˆ in the Hilbert space of S. This operator defines a basis of orthogonal
eigenstates |Ai〉, which for simplicity we take to be complete. This basis defines a family
and hence a framework EA in the Hilbert space of S. The discussion now proceeds in the
same way as in the textbook accounts of quantum measurements. The ‘classical’ apparatus
M is physically coupled to the quantum system S and through the quantum dynamics the
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‘pointer states’ of M become entangled with the states |Ai〉, in such a way that each quantum
state |Ak〉 is associated with a distinct pointer state Mk. The probability of obtaining the
state Mk in the experiment, from among all the different pointer states of the apparatus,
is then the probability associated with the state |Ak〉 it is coupled to, which according to
CQT is given by the Born weight Wψ(Ak), for a system in the state |ψ〉. Measuring the full
probability would involve repeating the experiment to obtain the appropriate statistics. The
detailed argument leading to the above result can be called a ‘derivation of the macroscopic
Born rule’ (Hartle, 1968; Weinberg, 2012). It assumes the microscopic Born rule (14) and
deduces from it a rule for measurement outcomes Mk.
We thus see that from the point of view of CQT the role of the external measurement
is essentially to identify the framework EA associated with the observable Aˆ and to link the
members of that framework to the pointer states of the apparatus. In the ontology of CQT
the operator Aˆ is equivalent to the set of beables comprising its basis in the Hilbert space,
together with the nonzero eigenvalues which do not matter for the purpose of determining
the framework. Frameworks of S that are incompatible with EA, for example EB, say, will
be perturbed by the physical interaction of the system S with M, and the properties Bi
of EB will bear no simple relationship to the pointer states of the apparatus M, which is
specifically designed to couple to the observable Aˆ and thus to choose the framework EA.
One more remark is pertinent in describing the effect of the apparatus in the process of
framework selection. We stated that the apparatus selects one among the multiplicity of
frameworks of the system S, but this is only true in the simplest case. There are many pos-
sible physical interactions which one might call ‘measurements’, which single out properties
belonging to more than one framework of S, in which case one is still left with multiple
sets of c-assertions even after the ‘measurement’. A classic case is the two-slit diffraction
experiment discussed in the previous section, in which the detection of the particle at a
particular point on the screen can belong either to a history in which the particle passed
through one slit or the other, or to another history, belonging to an incompatible frame-
work, in which the ‘particle’ diffracted from both slits on its way to the detector. There are
also system-apparatus interactions that fall short of being full measurements, often referred
to as ‘weak measurements’. As emphasized by Griffiths, all of these cases can be analyzed
within the Consistent Histories formulation, but the upshot is that one does not end up with
what we would term a unique physical truth, without resort to some additional macroscopic
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criterion.
2. Internal Mechanisms
In the spirit of a fully realistic formulation of quantum mechanics we can ask how to select
the physical framework, starting from the microscopic theory with no phenomenological
assumption, a question that is explicitly considered in the ‘Decoherent Histories’ formulation
of CQT (Gell-Mann and Hartle, 1993; Hartle, 2011) and also by Omne`s (1992). A careful
and detailed discussion of a simplified microscopic model of measurement has recently been
provided by Allahverdyan et al. (2013). In all of these approaches the microscopic system
S is considered to be a subsystem of a larger quantum system S′, which the authors often
consider to be the whole universe.
In the Decoherent Histories formulation, see e.g. Hartle (2011), the histories of the
larger system S′ are assembled, by a coarse-graining operation, into equivalence classes
that can themselves be considered to be histories of S′. In a first step let us not treat
the subsystem S as special and consider an appropriate set of coarse-grained histories of
S′, consisting entirely of what Gell-Mann and Hartle refer to as ‘quasiclassical properties’.
These histories constitute the ‘quasiclassical realm’ and we shall refer to them as ‘classical
histories’, suppressing the prefix ‘quasi’ which is implied. The above construction, which
relies heavily on the physical effects of decoherence for macroscopic properties, justifies the
statement that under appropriate circumstances classical mechanics emerges from QM in
the macroscopic limit.
Having established the existence of the quasiclassical realm (or framework) and of classical
histories, we are ready to discuss the internal (i.e. fundamental) mechanism for selecting a
physical framework. Consider the quantum system S to be a subsystem of the macroscopic
system S′ and now apply a coarse graining to the histories of S′ that leaves the properties of
the subsystem S unchanged, averaging only over the properties of the complement S˜ = S′−S.
In this way one obtains what we may call physical histories, histories whose properties are
quantum in nature for the degrees of freedom of S and classical in nature for the degrees of
freedom of the complement S˜.
In particular, consider a simple case in which S is a spin-½ prepared in the state |Sz〉 = +½
and the classical degrees of freedom describe the measurement of the x-component with a
Stern-Gerlach apparatus with pointer states Mx. The analysis then proceeds analogously to
the phenomenological case of an external selection mechanism considered above. The choice
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of measurement selects a particular framework of S whose properties are correlated to the
pointer states Mx, say, to form a physical framework of the full system S
′, with a well-defined
concept of physical truth. A different choice of measurement (say the y-component) selects
a different physical framework with pointer states My. Although the x and y frameworks
are incompatible (they refer to different sample spaces), the physical truths associated with
Mx and My respectively, can be unified by considering them to arise from conditional
probabilities, conditioned on pointing the apparatus in the x or y directions.
It should be clear from the above highly condensed discussion of external and internal
mechanisms of framework selection that there is no unique ‘physical’ mechanism, since
depending on the question asked and the physical circumstances, one could legitimately
consider physical truth to be definable by different choices of physical framework. Moreover,
the internal and external mechanisms should not be seen as mutually exclusive, but rather
as different perspectives on the same question. What remains invariant in CQT are the
fundamental tenets of the theory applicable to any closed system, i.e. the microscopic
theory with its Hilbert space ontology and its multiple incompatible sets of histories, which
are the starting point for defining a macroscopic physical framework selection mechanism.
Note also that our notion of selection differs from the ‘set selection problem’ defined by Kent
(1998) as the search for the preferred framework.
According to MIQM any closed quantum system obeys what one may call ‘framework
symmetry’, whereby no single framework yields truth values that are to be preferred over
those of any other framework. It is only in MAQM that this symmetry is broken and a
particular framework acquires the characteristic we call ‘physical truth’. Such macroscopic
symmetry breaking is standard in classical and quantum statistical mechanics, but here we
encounter it in the very formulation of quantum theory for any system S, even for a single
spin.
Let us comment briefly on the issue of state preparation alluded to in the preceding
discussion. Just as in classical mechanics (see Sec. II above), the designation of the state of
the system as an initial value in MIQM has a counterpart in MAQM in the physical operation
of state preparation using a macroscopic apparatus. A precise quantum description of such
a procedure has all of the same difficulties as a theory of measurement, but it can be carried
out in analogous fashion. We note, in addition, that the preparation of a pure state for a
given quantum system is at most an idealization, since interaction and entanglement with
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adjacent systems, or with the environment, will inevitably turn the initial pure state into
a mixed state. Fortunately, the formulation of CQT is based on a general Born rule (13)
based on the density matrix, rather than on pure states only.
To conclude this description of CQT we note that the feature of quantum mechanics
that distinguishes it from classical mechanics and makes it ‘weird’ or ‘mysterious’ has to
do with its assertions, not with its ontology, although the former are a consequence of the
latter. Contrary to the view expressed by Mermin (2013), the histories formulation does not
reinvent ‘reality’, it reinvents ‘truth’.
Figure 2 illustrates the CQT formulation, both the microscopic and macroscopic theories,
in such a way as to emphasize the similarities and differences with classical mechanics
depicted in Fig.1.
V. OTHER FORMULATIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS
With the expanded view of CQT presented above, many of the traditional formulations
or interpretations of quantum mechanics can to some extent already be seen to be contained
within the theory, rather than being considered as logical alternatives. Let us discuss the
major interpretations in turn.
A. Copenhagen Operationalism
Consider a quantum system S prepared in a state |ψ〉 represented by a ray in Hilbert space.
Since there is no way for the state to confer determinateness on an arbitrary property of the
system, i.e. to label the property as true or false in an absolute sense, Bohr’s operationalist
point of view denies intrinsic determinateness to any quantum property. Instead, the Born
weight is interpreted as the probability that the corresponding eigenvalue will be observed
when a (classical) measurement of a physical observable is carried out. Thus the property Ai,
say, acquires determinateness (some would say ‘existence’) only by virtue of the coupling
to the measurement instrument, as described in the previous section. In Bohr’s radical
operationalism (which we refer to as ‘Copenhagen’), there is no quantum ontology. Quantum
properties become physically real only when they are entangled with particular (classical)
measurement instruments. A particularly cogent description of the operationalist point of
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Beables (existables)
Assumables                       Predictables
Hamiltonian             State           Properties/Histories
ONTOLOGY
Hilbert space
(defines system)          (Ψ ,  ρ) deterministic
ASSERTIONS
Frameworks
 State                 Properties/Histories
     (probabilistic assertions)
Frameworks
E1 E2 . . . EK
PHYSICAL   ASSERTIONS
Selection of Physical Framework
Ephys      (probabilities)
External                        Internal
        (measurement)         (coarse graining)
MICROSCOPIC THEORY
MIQM
MACROSCOPIC THEORY
MAQM
    prob. fn1    prob. fn 2   . . .          prob. fn K
probability values
FIG. 2 Schematic representation of quantum mechanics. The top row describes the ontology,
which consists of a Hamiltonian, states, properties and histories, all of which are objects in Hilbert
space. The state is either a ray of vectors ψ (pure), or a unit-trace operator ρ (mixed), the
properties are subspaces of Hilbert space and histories are sets of properties defined at a sequence
of times. The assertions of the microscopic theory (MIQM, middle row) consist of probabilities
of properties and histories, conferred by the state which is the source of probability. For a given
state there are a multiplicity of contextual probability functions, each one associated with a subset
of properties or histories, called a framework, denoted by E1, E2, ...EK in the figure. In order to
arrive at physical assertions, a macroscopic framework selection mechanism is required (MAQM,
bottom row), which can proceed either phenomenologically via external measurements, or more
fundamentally via coarse graining and decoherence.
view may be found in the textbook by Peres (1995).
The Copenhagen view has been criticized, most notably by John Bell, as being ‘unpro-
fessionally vague and ambiguous’ (see Bell (2004), p. 173), since it introduces the undefined
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notion of measurement into the basic formulation of the theory, and since it assumes the
prior existence of classical mechanics (to describe the apparatus), whose origin and ontology
are not explained.
While we agree that the formulation appears strangely incomplete, we consider it to
be logically coherent. In fact, as indicated in the previous section, Copenhagen can be
seen as the specialization of CQT to the case of externally measured systems, leading to
‘recorded histories’, a point which has been emphasized by Hartle (2011). Thus Copenhagen
is included in CQT, but the reverse is not true. As mentioned above, moreover, the essential
role of external measurements in the Copenhagen approach can be viewed as providing the
selection of an appropriate physical framework, since the predictions themselves, in both
CQT and Copenhagen, involve a Born weight which refers only to the system S and not
to the apparatus. This, in our view, explains why the Copenhagen interpretation has been
considered adequate to the majority of physicists over the eighty-year history of QM, as
they investigate the vast richness of quantum phenomena without extensively probing its
philosophical implications. There is a sense in which the move from Copenhagen to CQT is
a short step, replacing the role of external measurement in choosing frameworks by a simple
interrogation among a set of available possibilities. It is in this sense that we can quote
Griffiths (2011a) and refer to CQT as “Copenhagen done right!”. From our point of view,
apart from the restriction to externally measured systems noted above, we agree with Bell
that the main philosophical flaw in Bohr’s operationalism is that measurement instruments
and the classical world are posited at the outset without further elucidation and without
explicit recognition that the instruments are after all made of atoms.
Quantum Information
A more sophisticated, or at least more modern, version of operationalism is the information-
theoretic approach, which considers quantum states as states of belief about the quantum
system, see for example Brukner and Zeilinger (1999), Caves et al. (2002), Fuchs (2010).
It is also an operationalist point of view, according to our definition, because the belief is
held by observers or agents external to the quantum system. It too recognizes no quantum
ontology. One can consider the information-theoretic formulation, like Copenhagen, to be
a specialization of CQT, so there is no need for proponents of CQT to ‘refute’ it. The
only part of its creed that CQT denies is the assertion that such an approach is necessary
because quantum states are ‘nothing but’ states of belief.
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B. The Orthodox or Dirac-von Neumann-Born formulation
Although the distinction is not often made, we shall follow Bub (1999) in distinguish-
ing between Bohr’s strict operationalism on the one hand, and the ‘orthodox’ or ‘textbook’
version of quantum mechanics on the other hand, which we associate with Dirac, von Neu-
mann and Born, see for example Landau and Lifshitz (1965). In contrast to what we have
called Copenhagen, the orthodox approach does have a quantum ontology, in that the wave
function ψ is considered to represent the system S, and it selects the set of determinate
properties as those properties A for which the Born weight Wψ(A) is either unity (true) or
zero (false), i.e. properties that are compatible with [ψ].
Any other property is indeterminate and therefore not part of the ontology. Indeterminate
properties are given the same interpretation as in the Copenhagen approach, namely that
the Born weight of an indeterminate property A in the state ψ is the probability that the
corresponding eigenvalue will be observed when an external measurement is made. The
orthodox approach is thus seen to be a combination of realism (the dynamic state ψ and
properties compatible with it are ‘real’) and operationalism (other properties are given their
meaning by reference to measurements). As is well known, however, attempts to describe the
measurement process dynamically within this theory encounter the notorious measurement
problem (the one Griffiths (2012) refers to as the ‘first’ measurement problem), which both
Dirac and von Neumann resolve by introducing a projection postulate, also known as collapse
of the wave function.
C. The de Broglie-Bohm hidden-variables formulation
This approach was introduced very early by de Broglie (1926) and abandoned because
of heavy criticism from Pauli and other defenders of the new quantum orthodoxy, and then
rediscovered by Bohm (1952a) as a concrete refutation of the prevailing view that no hidden-
variable formulation was consistent with QM. This view was based on the combination of
Gleason’s Theorem and the Bell-Kochen-Specker Theorem referred to above, but as was
later emphasized by Bell (1966), the application of the theorem depends on accepting the
full algebraic structure of Hilbert space in the ontology and assertions of the theory, including
the noncontextuality of the probability values associated with quantum properties.
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We shall follow the practice of referring to this formulation as ‘Bohmian mechanics’ (see
Du¨rr et al. (2013) for a modern version). Its ontology consists of a set of N ‘particles’, with
coordinates {Qi} in three-dimensional space, evolving in time. In addition, the ontology can
also be considered to comprise the wave function ψ(Q1, ..., Q3N) = ψ({Qi}) whose role is two-
fold: it tells the particles how to move and it determines the initial statistical distribution
of the ensemble of particles with density
ρ({Qi}, t0) = |ψ({Qi}, t0)|2, (26)
a relation that is preserved in time if it is satisfied at the initial time t0 and if ψ satisfies the
Schroedinger equation.
It is important to emphasize that no other part of the Hilbert space structure belongs
to the ontology of Bohmian mechanics. For example, the energy, spin, or momentum are
derived quantities inherited from classical mechanics and they are given an operationalist
interpretation in terms of external measurements. Even though one can define an intrinsic
momentum variable in terms of the beables of the theory, namely the {Qi} and ψ, a mea-
surement of momentum will be unrelated to this quantity; instead, it will be related to the
eigenvalues of the corresponding operator. Indeed, as noted by Bohm himself (Bohm, 1952b),
a free particle confined to a box of width L can be in a state of energy E = (1/2m)(nh/L)2
for some integer n, even though it is at rest (p = 0). A measurement of momentum, however,
will disturb the state and yield the values p = ±nh/L, given by the Born rule, as in the
Copenhagen approach.
This combination of realism and operationalism seems to us to be a major weakness of
Bohmian mechanics, no less than the well-known feature of nonlocal dynamics. Actually,
we see no physical basis for either feature. In principle, an equivalent formulation could be
constructed with momenta {Pi} as the fundamental beables, or indeed with eigenstates of
any hermitian operator (see below). Thus, although Bohmiam mechanics does contain a
microscopic theory based on the ontology of particle coordinates, together with a guiding
wavefunction, this theory is so impoverished, lacking as it does quantities like momentum,
energy, spin, as to be physically useless without the operationalism that restores the latter
quantities.
Bell (2004) (p. 77) has drawn an interesting analogy between Bohmian mechanics and a
constructive theory of Lorentz (1916) that retains the aether and explains the experimental
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consequences of Lorentz transformations through a modification of the dynamics (see also
Bub (1999)). This contrasts with Einstein’s reformulation of the basic geometry of space-
time that incorporates Lorentz invariance at the outset. In a similar way, Bohmian mechanics
retains some of the classical ontology of local beables, and relies on nonlocal dynamics to
obtain agreement with experiment, whereas QM, at least in its CQT formulation, changes
the geometry of phase space and then draws the necessary epistemological consequences.
The nonlocal character of Bohmian mechanics led John Bell to ask whether any theory
agreeing with the predictions of QM must be nonlocal. His celebrated theorem (Bell, 1964)
states that a theory satisfying a condition he termed ‘local causality’ (see Bell (2004), p.232)
must violate QM, a result which has led to the frequent statement that ‘QM is nonlocal’
(e.g. Goldstein et al. (2011)). It is important to note, however, that Bell’s condition of local
causality can be formulated only within a classical ontology. In the Hilbert-space ontology
the probability functions appearing in Bell’s local causality condition are undefined. We
therefore suggest that the proper conclusion to draw from Bell’s theorem is that QM violates
‘classical locality’, but preserves a notion of ‘quantum locality’, referred to by Griffiths
(2011c), Sec. 6, as ‘Einstein locality’.
D. Modal Formulations
A natural generalization of Bohmian mechanics consists in selecting an arbitrary hermi-
tian operator (or ‘observable’) Rˆ and designating it as determinate, given the state ψ. This
variable defines at any time a determinate sublattice D(ψ, Rˆ) which is Boolean, in contrast
to the full non-Boolean lattice of q-properties LH. (The sublattice D consists essentially of
the eigenspaces of Rˆ, but with special treatment given to those eigenspaces that have no
overlap with ψ.) Thus all of the properties belonging to D can be considered determinate,
i.e. they are either true or false in ‘reality’, but with a probability determined by ψ. (This is
a simplified account. For details see Bub (1999)). Any other property of LH not belonging
to D(ψ, Rˆ) is indeterminate in the system S and must thus be given an operationalist inter-
pretation. The modal formulations have more flexibility than Bohmian mechanics, since any
observable can be designated as determinate and Rˆ can even vary in time, but they share
with the Bohmian view the feature that in any instantiation a single set of properties is
determinate, i.e. can be considered ‘real’. CQT in its microscopic version, in contrast, con-
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siders all quantum properties on an equal footing (Equality) and simply assigns a contextual
meaning to the probability functions in its assertions.
E. Many Worlds Formulations
The original Many Worlds formulation of Everett (1957) (he called it the “Relative State”
theory) was motivated by a critique of Copenhagen operationalism similar to those of Ein-
stein and Bell. The critique is well illustrated by Everett’s statement quoted by Byrne
(2007):
The Copenhagen interpretation is hopelessly incomplete because of its a priori
reliance on classical physics as well as a philosophic monstrosity with a ‘reality’
concept for the macroscopic world and denial of the same for the microcosm.
In the Many Worlds theory the quantum ontology consists exclusively of the wavefunction
ψU of the whole universe, which evolves deterministically according to the Schroedinger
equation (or a suitable relativistic generalization). This assumption is unsurprising and
it is consistent with CQT. The implications of this fact, however, are stated in language
that differs for different proponents of the theory, and that leads to surprising and at times
extravagant claims, see, e.g. DeWitt (1970).
In certain versions of the theory the wave function ψU splits into diverse branches (referred
to as ‘worlds’), each one of which is supposed to be ‘real’, in the course of the unitary
evolution. No direct recourse to operationalism, as in the Orthodox formulation of subsection
B above, is possible here, since there are no external observers for the universe as a whole, and
all properties of individual systems must emerge from an analysis of the quantum dynamics.
Thus basic notions such as physical properties of individual systems, determinateness, or
probabilities of measurement results, that are at the heart of the assertions of QM, are the
subjects of detailed analysis and vary significantly among different versions of the theory.
If one goes back to the basic tenets of the theory, namely the deterministic and unitary
evolution of the state, then the Everett formulation has many points in common with CQT
(see, for example, the minimal formulation of Tegmark (1997), in which he distinguishes
between the ‘inside view’ and the ‘outside view’). This explains why Hartle (2005) refers to
Decoherent Histories as “an extension and completion of the Everett formulation”.
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The problem with most ‘Many Worlds’ formulations subsequent to Everett’s, in our
opinion, is that their ability to make any physical predictions depends from the outset on
concepts such as ‘our experiences’, ‘branches’, ‘worlds’, ‘observers’, ‘belief’ or ‘real’, that are
often imprecisely defined and whose meaning often differs between different authors. The
root of the problem seems to us to lie in a confusion between the task of formulating QM
for arbitrary physical systems on the one hand, and that of applying the formulation to
a particular system, the universe as a whole, on the other hand. The distinction between
the two tasks exists for classical as well as quantum mechanics, but the cost of confounding
them is much greater in the quantum case, at least in CQT, where the distinction between
MIQM and MAQM plays such an important role. Quantum cosmology can of course be
formulated in the histories approach, the Decoherent Histories version being the best suited
for that purpose, but the particular focus on the universe as a whole can obscure important
features of the more general theory of histories.
F. Spontaneous Collapse Theories
In contrast to all other ‘interpretations’, which assume the correctness of the physical
predictions of QM, spontaneous collapse theories (see, e.g. Adler and Bassi (2009)) belong
to the category that give the answer ‘no’ to the first question in the Introduction: they correct
the Schroedinger equation by adding a stochastic force which ensures the physical collapse of
the wavefunction. The theories have a classical ontology, consisting exclusively of the state
ψ, whose time evolution is adjusted to agree with known quantum properties. Our point of
view is that such theories (they are really different theories, not just different formulations)
are logically coherent, but that until there is experimental evidence for departures from
standard QM we see no convincing motivation for modifying its physical content. A major
shortcoming of spontaneous collapse theories, which they share with the Bohmian approach,
is their extreme nonlocality, which makes them very difficult, perhaps impossible, to render
Lorentz invariant.
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VI. CONCLUSION
CQT asserts that the basic microscopic formulation of QM for a closed system is relatively
simple and involves a minimum of assumptions, the essential one being the Hilbert-space on-
tology. The result is what we have called MIQM, which can be summarized by the existence
of a multiplicity of mutually incompatible sets of c-assertions (arising from incompatible
frameworks), each one of which embodies its own notion of c-truth. We thus arrive at the
novel conclusion that the quantum mechanics of closed systems is physically incomplete,
but logically coherent. The necessary completion entails some macroscopic mechanism for
selecting a physical framework from the multiplicity of incompatible frameworks of the mi-
croscopic theory. This is what we have called MAQM and it can be accomplished in a
variety of different ways, which we classify as external (e.g. measurement) or internal (e.g.
coarse-graining to construct a physical framework consisting of histories composed of both
quantum and classical properties). Most of the well-known paradoxes and mysteries of quan-
tum mechanics appear only when one asks about measurement results and the transmittal
of quantum information, i.e. when one asks about macroscopic phenomena that require
apparatus, observers and agents external to the system. In CQT these questions are treated
in the macroscopic selection phase of the theory, not as part of the microscopic formulation.
There is an analogy between the selection of a physical framework in quantum mechanics
and the treatment of the arrow of time in statistical mechanics. A phenomenological for-
mulation simply posits the second law and derives the irreversible hydrodynamic equations
by appealing to conservation laws and general symmetry principles. This corresponds to
our external framework selection mechanism. A more fundamental approach (the internal
mechanism) starts from the microscopic description of a large system and derives the equa-
tions satisfied by macrovariables via a coarse-graining procedure. This latter program was
initiated by Maxwell and Boltzmann and its full realization remains a subject of study (and
controversy!) to this day, but the essential correctness of the Maxwell-Boltzmann point of
view is generally accepted (see e.g. Lebowitz (1999)).
In his last lecture (delivered in 1989), entitled ‘Against Measurement’, Bell (2004) ex-
pressed the following view regarding QM:
Surely, after 62 years, we should have an exact formulation of some serious part
of quantum mechanics? By “exact” I do not of course mean “exactly true”. I
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mean only that the theory should be fully formulated in mathematical terms,
with nothing left to the discretion of the theoretical physicist,... until workable
approximations are needed in applications... Is it not good to know what follows
from what, even if it is not really necessary for all practical purposes (‘FAPP’)?
The answer provided by CQT is that MIQM is the desired full mathematical formulation,
and that it is only in attempting to select a macroscopic physical framework, i.e. to find
‘physical truth’, that ‘FAPP’ arguments become necessary.
We conclude by listing the two principal advances which in our opinion Compatible Quan-
tum Theory (CQT) makes over earlier histories formulations. The first is the distinction we
have drawn between the microscopic theory (MIQM) on the one hand and the macroscopic
theory (MAQM) on the other. From the point of view of CQT, moreover, the Copenhagen
viewpoint, which involves a phenomenological framework selection mechanism via external
measurement, can be viewed as a version of MAQM.
A second, more concrete advance made in the present paper is the derivation of the princi-
pal result of the microscopic theory, the quadratic Born formula (22) for the probability of a
history. This result was postulated by earlier workers, as was the consistency or decoherence
condition (24), but here they are derived starting from the Hilbert space ontology and the
assumption of noncontextuality of probability values for histories and subhistories. In these
derivations, essential roles are played by Gleason’s Theorem, by an important ‘quadratic’
theorem based on it due to Cassinelli and Zanghi, and by Nistico’s extension of this theorem
to histories, drawing on ideas of Omne`s.
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Appendix A: Lattices, Set Theory, Classical Logic and Probability Theory
In this appendix we provide a brief summary of set theory, classical (Aristotelian) logic
and classical probability theory, and we show how the three are formally related.
Lattices
In pure mathematics, a lattice is a set with a partial ordering ≤, and two binary opera-
tions, ‘meet’ and ‘join’, that satisfy the relations
meet(A,B) ≤ A, meet(A,B) ≤ B, (A.1a)
If C ≤ A and C ≤ B, then C ≤ meet(A,B), (A.1b)
join(A,B) ≥ A, join(A,B) ≥ B, (A.1c)
If C ≥ A and C ≥ B, then C ≥ join(A,B), (A.1d)
yielding the greatest lower bound and the least upper bound of the two operands. A bounded
lattice has a universal lower bound ⊥b and a universal upper bound >t (we have placed
subscripts and superscripts on these symbols to avoid confusion with the ⊥ symbol signifying
orthogonality, or the T symbol signifying truth, to be used later). A self-dual lattice has also
a unary operation A→ ∼ A. The join and meet of A and ∼ A are >t and ⊥b, respectively,
and the operation∼ induces an automorphism of the lattice in which the ordering is reversed.
Set Theory
For simplicity we consider a discrete set Ω of N elements x ∈ Ω. The subsets A,B, ... of
Ω form a set L(Ω) of sets (in set theory, a field of sets) for which the operations of union ∪,
intersection ∩ and complement ∼ obey the axioms of set theory:
A ∪  = A A ∩ Ω = A, (A.2a)
A∪ ∼ A = Ω A∩ ∼ A = , (A.2b)
A ∪B = B ∪ A A ∩B = B ∩ A, (A.2c)
A ∪ (B ∪ C) = (A ∪B) ∪ C, A ∩ (B ∩ C) = (A ∩B) ∩ C, (A.2d)
A ∪ (B ∩ C) = (A ∪B) ∩ (A ∪ C), A ∩ (B ∪ C) = (A ∩B) ∪ (A ∩ C), (A.2e)
where  is the empty subset of Ω.
Clearly, L(Ω) is a self-dual lattice if one interprets ∪ as the join and ∩ as the meet, and
Ω, as >t and ⊥b. The first four lines of (A.2) are satisfied by all self-dual lattices. But
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L(Ω) has an additional property (the distributive law (A.2e)) not shared by all self-dual
lattices, which makes it a Boolean lattice.
Classical Logic
The subsets A,B, ... can also be considered as logical propositions, in which case the
operations of set theory become logical operations
∪ −→ ∨ disjunction (or), (A.3a)
∩ −→ ∧ conjunction (and), (A.3b)
∼ −→ ¬ negation (not), (A.3c)
Ω −→ T (true), (A.3d)
 −→ F (false). (A.3e)
Under the replacements (A.3), Eqs.(A.2) become the usual axioms of propositional calculus
A ∨ F = A A ∧ T = A, (A.4a)
A∨ ∼ A = T A∧ ∼ A = F, (A.4b)
A ∨B = B ∨ A A ∧B = B ∧ A, (A.4c)
A ∨ (B ∨ C) = (A ∨B) ∨ C, A ∧ (B ∧ C) = (A ∧B) ∧ C, (A.4d)
A ∨ (B ∧ C) = (A ∨B) ∧ (A ∨ C), A ∧ (B ∨ C) = (A ∧B) ∨ (A ∧ C). (A.4e)
In particular (A.2e) becomes the distributive law (A.4e). The set L(Ω) of 2N propositions
forms a Boolean lattice under the logical operations. On this lattice we can define truth
functions T (A) with values 1 (True) and 0 (False). Such truth functions must agree with
the standard truth tables for the logical functions, which imply the algebraic relations
T (¬A) = 1− T (A), (A.5a)
T (A ∧B) = T (A)T (B), (A.5b)
T (A ∨B) = T (A) + T (B)− T (A)T (B), (A.5c)
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and must also satisfy T (Ω) = 1, T () = 0. We shall refer to these equations as ‘truth table
relations’.
Let us consider in particular those subsets of Ω containing only one member, that is sets
of the form {x} where x ∈ Ω. We may call them atomic sets, and the corresponding logical
propositions atomic propositions. Then by applying (A.5) we find that any truth function
must assign the value 1 to some atomic proposition and 0 to all the others. We shall denote
the truth function that assigns 1 to a particular {x} by Tx. Then for x, y ∈ Ω
Tx({y}) = 1 if y = x, otherwise 0. (A.6)
Again applying (A.5), we see that for any A ∈ L(Ω),
Tx(A) = 1 if x ∈ A, otherwise 0. (A.7)
We may say that x is the “source of truth” for the atomic truth function Tx.
Probability Theory
Truth functions can be generalized by introducing a probability function P(A) from L(Ω)
to the unit interval [0, 1]. One first defines a measure as a function from L(Ω) to the interval
[0,∞], which satisfies the linearity condition for countable sets of disjoint subsets,
P(A(1) ∨ A(2) ∨ ...) = P(A(1)) + P(A(2)) + ..., where A(i) ∧ A(j) =  for i 6= j. (A.8)
A probability measure or probability function (classically, these two ideas can be identified)
is a measure which satisfies the additional condition
P(Ω) = 1. (A.9)
(The relation P() = 0 is already implied by (A.8)). In the context of probability theory,
the elements A(i) are called ‘events’ and the set Ω is the ‘sample space’ of the probability
measure. It can be shown that for any two events A,B, (A.8) implies the relation
P(A ∨B) = P(A) + P(B)− P(A ∧B). (A.10)
The converse is true for a finite Ω. We shall sometimes refer to Eqs. (A.8) and (A.9) as the
‘Kolmogorov conditions’, and to (A.10) as the ‘Kolmogorov overlap equation’.
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One notices a similarity between (A.10) and (A.5c). This suggests that even on a formal
level there is a relationship between probabilities and truth values. The relationship can be
displayed explicitly by starting not with the probability function P(A), where A ranges over
L, but with a function p(x), where x ranges over Ω, and p satisfies
p(x) ≥ 0, x ∈ Ω, (A.11a)∑
x
p(x) = 1. (A.11b)
This p can be understood naturally as a probability distribution over Ω.
We can now construct from p a probability function P on L(Ω) by setting
P(A) =
∑
x∈Ω
p(x)Tx(A) =
∑
x∈A
p(x). (A.12)
It is easily seen that P defined in this way satisfies the conditions (A.8) and (A.9) as well
as the overlap equation corollary (A.10). The subtracted term P(A ∧ B) in (A.10) has
the same origin as that in (A.5c): those points x that belong to both A and B contribute
twice to P(A) + P(B), as well as to T (A) + T (B). This explains the formal resemblance
between (A.5c) and (A.10). If Ω is finite, one may alternatively take P satisfying (A.10) as
fundamental, and derive the atomic probability function p satisfying (A.12) by setting
p(x) = P({x}), (A.13)
for each x ∈ Ω. We have presented the detailed argument leading to (A.12) in order to
justify the statement that the probability function P can be thought of as a ‘distributed
truth function’ with p controlling the distribution of weights to various choices of the source
of truth that determines Tx.
The above ideas have been extended to a continuous universe Ω of points x bearing
infinitesimal probability, by replacing the sum in (A.12) with an integral. The technical
details are well known and will not be described here.
It should be noted, moreover, that our definitions of probability and truth are formal
ones, and they are thus consistent with either a frequentist or a Bayesian approach to
probabilities. At this stage we are not inquiring into the relationship of probabilities to
the ‘real world’, which is where such distinctions arise. The connection between truth and
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probability explored above exists already on the formal level and is therefore independent
of any real-world interpretation of probability.
Appendix B: Static CQT
This appendix presents the detailed mathematical derivation of the principles of CQT
in the so-called ‘static’ case, i.e. without taking time dependence into account. These
principles are the interpretation of probability functions as being contextual to (static)
frameworks, and the derivation of the Born rule assuming only the Hilbert space ontology
and the noncontextuality of probability values. The mathematical formalism we use, the
so-called ‘lattice’ and ‘algebraic’ approaches, goes back to von Neumann and collaborators,
but our argumentation is novel in some respects.
In the abstract study of what Birkhoff and von Neumann (1936) called quantum logic,
two independent traditions have grown up, the algebraic and the logical. In the algebraic
approach (von Neumann, 1932, 1996) one starts with an abstract operator algebra and im-
poses various restrictions on it until the resulting structure can be modeled by the operators
in a Hilbert space, including the projection operators in particular. In the logical approach
(Birkhoff and von Neumann, 1936) one starts with an abstract lattice and imposes restric-
tions until the lattice can be identified as LH (see below) derived from a Hilbert space H.
These two approaches are admirably summarized in a paper by David (2012), in which
the algebraic (chapter 3) and logical (chapter 4) approaches are presented separately and
independently, each step by step culminating in the Hilbert space model. The successive
restrictions in each approach are of course postulated and not derived from any logical
foundation; they are justified in terms of the desired consequence.
We, on the other hand, are starting from the assumption of a Hilbert space ontology and
finding within it the lattice LH as well as the projectors [A]. Hence we shall freely mix the
lattice and the operator concepts, drawing on each to help prove theorems relating to the
other.
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B.1. The property calculus and the search for quantum logic in LH
We start with the logical, or lattice, point of view. As mentioned in Sec. IV.A, quantum
properties are represented by closed linear subspaces of Hilbert space. Although these sub-
spaces are sets of vectors, they do not form a field of sets in that the set-theoretical union
of two subspaces is in general not a subspace, i.e. it is not a vector space. Therefore the
logical relations of properties cannot be carried over from the relations of subspaces as sets of
vectors, and the procedure used in Appendix A, relevant to the classical case, is inapplicable
to the totality of subspaces.
We shall follow Birkhoff and von Neumann (1936) in defining ‘q-logical’ operations on
the subspaces of the Hilbert space H, and only afterwards examine the extent to which this
‘quantum logic’ reproduces classical logic. (To ensure that all statements apply if H has
infinite but countable dimension, we note that by definition a Hilbert space is topologically
complete, and we specify that the word subspace is to mean a topologically closed linear
subspace of H, so that each subspace is itself a Hilbert space.)
Thus we define
q-not A = ¬qA = orthogonal complement of A, (B.1a)
A q-and B = A ∧q B = (A ∩B), (B.1b)
A q-or B = A ∨q B = span(A,B), (B.1c)
and note that the q-not (¬q) and q-or (∨q) operations are different from the corresponding
ones in (A.3), since the orthogonal complement of a subspace A contains only those vectors
orthogonal to the vectors in A, and the span of two subspaces A and B contains all linear
combinations of vectors in A and B, including those not belonging to either A or B.
With these definitions the subspaces form a lattice LH, defined by taking the ordering
operation A ≤ B to mean that A is a subspace of B, and ∼ A to be ¬qA. As in the lattice of
classical logic (A.4), the glb and lub turn out here to be ∧q and ∨q as defined in (B.1), and >t
and ⊥b turn out here to be H and O, the latter defined as the ‘zero subspace’ containing only
the vector 0. It can be shown that this lattice is self-dual under the operations A ↔ ¬qA,
∨q ↔ ∧q, and in addition we have A ⊥ ¬qA (see below). Moreover, ¬qA is the unique
subspace A′ orthogonal to A and satisfying A∨q A′ = H. Careful proofs of many properties
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of H and its subspaces are given in Driver (2003). In particular the important lemma
A ∨q ¬qA = H (B.2)
is proved in detail with illuminating comments. In the mathematical literature a lattice LH
possessing the above properties is referred to as an orthocomplemented lattice, or ortholattice
for short.
The operations defined in (B.1) can be used to express certain familiar ideas connected
with subspaces:
(i) orthogonality: A and B are orthogonal (A⊥B) iff every vector of A is orthogonal to every
vector of B. Obviously A ⊥ B is equivalent to B ⊥ A. In terms of lattice operations,
A⊥B iff A ≤ ¬qB. (B.3)
(ii) projectors: The projector of a subspace A shall be written as [A]; it is the unique self-
adjoint operator such that [A]v = v if v is a vector ∈ A, and [A]v = 0 if v ∈ ¬qA. Given [A],
A is determined. There is thus a one to one correspondence between subspaces of Hilbert
space and projectors. Note that projectors, which in general are not additive, are additive
among orthogonal subspaces: if A⊥B then [A ∨q B] = [A] + [B]. An operator Aˆ is the
projector of some subspace if and only if Aˆ2 = Aˆ. Moreover, Eq.(B.2) implies the relation
[¬qA] = I− [A], where I is the identity operator on H. These properties will be referred to
without comment hereafter. For relevant theorems and proofs, see Driver (2003).
Since, as mentioned above, the span is not the set theoretical union, there is no guarantee
that the q-operations will satisfy laws analogous to (A.2). In fact, the operations ¬q, ∧q, ∨q
satisfy all but one of the laws of logic, namely
A ∨q O = A A ∧q H = A, (B.4a)
A ∨q ¬qA = H A ∧q ¬qA = O, (B.4b)
A ∨q B = B ∨q A A ∧q B = B ∧q A, (B.4c)
A ∨q (B ∨q C) = (A ∨q B) ∨q C A ∧q (B ∧q C) = (A ∧q B) ∧q C. (B.4d)
However, the distributive law (A.4e) does not hold :
A ∨q (B ∧q C) 6= (A ∨q B) ∧q (A ∨q C),
A ∧q (B ∨q C) 6= (A ∧q B) ∨q (A ∧q C), (B.5)
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in general, as shown, for example, by the counterexample of three distinct coplanar one-
dimensional subspaces. It follows that the property calculus (B.4) does not constitute a
proper logic, and the term ‘quantum logic’ frequently used for these relations is apt to lead
to confusion, so we shall avoid it.
B.2. Sublattices of LH, sample spaces and event algebras
We have appended the subscript ‘q’ to the operations in (B.1) as a reminder that these
are not true logical operations on the whole lattice LH of Hilbert subspaces since they do
not satisfy the distributive law. This is expressed by saying that LH is not a Boolean lattice.
We shall see, however, that there are so-called ‘Boolean sublattices’, within which the dis-
tributive law is satisfied, thus allowing the definition of a sublattice-dependent (contextual)
logic, which we refer to as ‘c-logic’.
Rather than trying to identify all Boolean sublattices of LH, we shall follow Griffiths in
starting from a stronger requirement, that the desired lattice should be able to support a
probability function. We adhere to the principle voiced in Griffiths (2013), that a probability
function must be based on a sample space, that is, a set of mutually exclusive alternatives
which together exhaust all possibilities. In the language of subspaces, this means that a
sample space S is a set of mutually orthogonal subspaces {D1, D2, ...} that together span
H. (Despite the name ‘sample space’, S itself is not a subspace of Hilbert space, but a set
of subspaces. Within Appendix B alone, we use the letter D to denote the members of S,
since we have other uses for the letter A.)
It is useful, at this point, to slide from the logical to the algebraic mode by using the fact
noted above that the subspaces Di are in one-to-one correspondence with their projectors
[Di]. The projectors of S form an orthogonal decomposition of the identity operator I; that
is,
S = {D1, D2, ..., } = {Di|i ∈ J }, (B.6)
where ∑
i∈J
[Di] = I, and Di ⊥ Dj if i 6= j. (B.7)
Here J is the finite or countably infinite set of indices i used in the definition of S.
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The condition Di ⊥ Dj translates to [Di][Dj] = [Dj][Di] = 0, and for the case i = j we
have [Di][Di] = [Di], so that (B.7) can be written entirely in terms of projectors as
∑
i
[Di] = I, and [Di][Dj] = [Di]δij. (B.8)
We may sometimes use the notation [S] for the set of projectors {[Di]}.
Now let an ‘event’ EJ be a subspace determined by a subset J of J . This can be any
subset, including the empty set or the whole set J , so that if J has only a finite number n
of members, there will be 2n possible events. The subspace EJ is defined as
EJ = (∨q)i∈JDi, (B.9)
and its algebraic representation is
[EJ ] =
∑
i∈J
[Di]. (B.10)
We note that (B.10) can also be written as
[EJ ] =
∑
i∈J
ci[Di], (B.11)
where ci = 1 if i ∈ J , otherwise ci = 0. We see that c2i = ci for all i, so that (Σici[Di])2 =
Σi,jcicj[Di][Dj] = Σici[Di] on account of (B.8), and therefore [EJ ]
2 = [EJ ], as expected for
a projector.
Now we introduce the event space ES consisting of the events EJ corresponding to all the
subsets J of J . (We briefly postpone the use of Griffiths’ term ‘event algebra’ for ES .) The
event space, like the sample space, is not a subspace of H but a set of such subspaces. The
sample space S shall be called the basis of the event space ES . Note, however, that the word
basis here does not refer to a basis of a vector space; the members of S may be many- or
even infinite-dimensional subspaces of H.
We now show, in Theorem B1, that ES is closed under the operations (B.1) and is therefore
a sublattice of LH, which we can therefore denote LS . In Theorem B2 we show moreover
that ES = LS is a Boolean lattice, meaning that its members obey not only the first four
equations of (A.4) but also the q-analogue of the distributive law (A.4e). This enables one
to treat the operations (B.1) as true logical operations as long as one draws propositions
only from LS . We shall refer to this restricted logic as contextual logic (c-logic).
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Theorem B1: The event space ES is a sublattice of LH, since it is closed under the
operations (B.1).
Proof: In the following we note that the J are classical sets to which the operators ∼, ∪,
∩ of Eq. (A.2) can be applied.
(i) Let the event A = EJ be some member of ES , which satisfies the relation [A] = Σici[Di]
in accordance with (B.11). Then [¬qA] = I− [A] = Σi(1− ci)[Di] since Σi[Di] = I by (B.7).
But the definition of ci makes 1− ci = 1 if i ∈ ∼J , otherwise 0. Therefore applying (B.11)
again we have [¬qA] = Σi∈∼J [Di] = E∼J , which belongs to [ES ]. Hence ¬qA belongs to ES .
(ii) Let A = EJ , B = EJ ′ . Then using (B.11) we have [A ∧q B] = Σi,i′cic′i′ [Di ∧q Di′ ] =
Σicic
′
i[Di]. Applying (B.11) again we get [A ∧q B] = Σi∈J&i∈J ′ [Di] = [EJ∩J ′ ], which belongs
to [ES ]. Hence A ∧q B belongs to ES .
(iii) Let A = EJ , B = EJ ′ . By (B.9) we have A ∨q B = (∨q)i∈JDi ∨q (∨q)i∈J ′Di =
(∨q)i∈(J∪J ′)Di = EJ∪J ′ , which belongs to ES .
(iv) In part (iii), instead of A and B we could have had any sequence A(1), A(2), ..., A(k), ...,
finite or infinite, withA(k) = EJ(k) for each k. Then we would have (∨q)kA(k) = (∨q)k(∨q)i∈J(k)Di =
(∨q)i∈(∪kJ(k))Di = E∪kJ(k) .
It follows from the above reasoning that ES is a sublattice of LH, which we can call the
lattice closure of [S]. We express this fact by the relation
ES = LS , (B.12)
referred to above. We now show that ES is a Boolean lattice - that is, the q-analog of the
distributive law (A.4e) holds.
Theorem B2: If A, B, C belong to ES , then they satisfy the distributive laws:
(A ∧q B) ∨q (A ∧q C) = A ∧q (B ∨q C), (B.13)
and
(A ∨q B) ∧q (A ∨q C) = A ∨q (B ∧q C). (B.14)
Proof: We refer to the formulas developed in the proofs of Theorem B1 (ii) and (iii): if
A = EJ and B = E
′
J then
A ∧q B = EJ∩J ′ , (B.15)
and
A ∨q B = EJ∪J ′ . (B.16)
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Now, if A, B, C all belong to ES , then applying (B.15) and (B.16) to arbitrary pairs of
events we arrive at
(A ∧B) ∨ (A ∧ C) = E(J∩J ′)∪(J∩J ′′), (B.17)
and
A ∧q (B ∨q C) = EJ∩(J ′∪J ′′). (B.18)
Since the J ’s are classical sets, we have in accordance with (A.4e)
(J ∩ J ′) ∪ (J ∩ J ′′) = J ∩ (J ′ ∪ J ′′), (B.19)
from which (B.13) follows. Equation (B.14) is proved similarly.
Griffiths (2013) uses the term ‘event algebra’ rather than ‘event space’. In modern math-
ematics, an ‘algebra’ is a set of entities with (i) an addition and a multiplication, both
commutative and associative, (ii) multiplication distributive over addition, with zero and
one having the usual properties, and (iii) an associative multiplication by the elements,
called scalars, of a field. Thus one can always divide a member of an algebra by any nonzero
scalar, but not necessarily by a nonzero algebraic element.
In lattice theory, however, there exists the term ‘Boolean algebra’, which denotes not a
modern algebra with a special ‘Boolean’ feature, but simply a lattice that is Boolean in the
sense of Theorem B2. A Boolean algebra in this sense does not necessarily have anything
to do with an algebra in the modern sense, nor conversely. The reason for this linguistic
inconsistency is that Boole’s work actually preceded the rise of the modern concept of an
algebra. We shall use the term Boolean algebra in its lattice theory sense.
Given a sample space S, it is evident from Theorems B1 and B2 that its event space ES is
a Boolean algebra. But also, the space [ES ] of its projectors forms an algebra in the modern
sense, provided that one takes the underlying scalar field to be the 2-member field Z/2Z
(the integers modulo 2). Griffiths does not draw a distinction between these two spaces,
which after all are in 1-1 correspondence. Consequently his term ‘event algebra’ could be
taken either in the lattice or the modern sense. In fact, since the appellation in either sense
is correct provided one starts with a sample space, there is no need to quibble about which
sense is meant. In the following subsections, though, we shall lean more to the lattice point
of view, so that unless otherwise stated the event algebra of S shall mean ES , rather than
the set [ES ] of corresponding projectors.
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B.3. Static frameworks
In order to define probability functions we shall need Griffiths’s notion of a ‘framework’.
What we call a static framework is nothing other than the event algebra ES of a sample
space S. In accordance with (B.12) we may also say it is the lattice closure LS of S. Thus
any sample space S defines a framework ES = LS , which has S as its basis. For the rest
of Appendix B we shall freely say ‘framework’ meaning ‘static framework’. Let us delve
somewhat further into the lattice properties of LS . In particular we ask whether the basis
S is unique. That is, would it be possible that two different projective decompositions of I
have the same lattice closure? In that case we could have LS = LS′ even though S 6= S ′.
To answer this we draw on the concept of atoms in a lattice. In any sublattice L of LH
an atom or atomic subspace is a nonzero member of L that has no proper nonzero subspace
in L. In other words, A is an atom of L iff when A ∈ L, any B ∈ L that is ≤ A is either
A or O. It is important that the same subspace can be atomic in one sublattice but not in
another. In the whole lattice LH, the atomic subspaces are just the 1-dimensional ones. But
a 2-dimensional subspace, for example, is atomic in a sublattice that contains it but none
of its 1-dimensional subspaces. Even an infinite-dimensional subspace can be atomic in a
sufficiently coarse sublattice. Any subspace A will be atomic in the lattice composed of A,
¬qA, H, and O.
This situation is quite analogous to that of the lattice of sets of a space Ω considered
in Appendix A. The 1-dimensional subspaces of H are analogous to sets {x} containing a
single point of Ω. Sets containing many points can be atomic in a sufficiently coarse field of
sets. Any set is atomic in the field (lattice) composed of that set, its complement, Ω, and
. In classical mechanics, to be sure, we are primarily concerned with the full LΩ so that
only the sets {x} are atomic.
We now answer the question posed above about the uniqueness of S, given its lattice
closure.
Theorem B3: A static framework has only one basis, which consists exactly of all of its
atoms.
Proof: By examining the definition of ‘atom’, and using Theorem B1 to replace LS by ES ,
the reader may verify that if S is a sample space, all of its members are atoms of LS , and
that LS has no other atoms. The theorem follows.
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We now see that the events called elementary by Griffiths (2013) are precisely the atoms
of the event algebra considered as a lattice. (In the above reasoning we have not appealed to
the property of ‘atomic covering’, as proving it would take us deeper into lattice theory than
we intend to go.) Inasmuch as S and LS determine one another uniquely, Griffiths applies
the term framework indiscriminately to both. Our usage is stricter: the static framework is
LS , which is the same as ES , and we refer to S as its basis.
B.4. Probabilities: Mackey’s generalization of measure and Gleason’s Theorem
We now approach the question of probabilities. As mentioned above, we follow Griffiths
in taking the term ‘probability function’ in the classical sense, as being a function from some
lattice L(Ω) of subsets of a universe Ω, to nonnegative real numbers such that (A.8) and
(A.9) are satisfied. Any static framework LS , being the lattice closure of a sample space S,
can be regarded as such a lattice because, in accordance with Theorem B1, the members of
LS are in one-to-one correspondence with the subsets of the sample space S.
To construct a classical probability function over this sample space, one need only assign
to each member of S (i.e., each atom of LS) a real nonnegative probability so that the sum
over all the atoms is 1. The probability of any set of atoms is then the sum of the individual
atomic probabilities, as given in (A.8). Through the correspondence between subsets of S
and events E of the framework ES = LS , this classical probability function may be regarded
as acting on subspaces E of the Hilbert space. In this way the probability function is
inexorably tied to the sample space S and to the framework ES , so we shall denote it as PS ,
or as PES , or PE .
According to the above construction the probability assigned to any atom is freely chosen,
provided they are all nonnegative and sum to 1. As explained more fully in Subsection IV.B
of the main text, however, it is physically appropriate to constrain the atomic probabilities
so that any event has the same probability, independent of the framework to which it belongs
- a constraint we refer to as the noncontextuality of probability values. Before we show how
to satisfy this constraint, we need to discuss the ideas of Mackey.
As mentioned earlier, Birkhoff and von Neumann (1936) drew attention to the lattice of
subspaces of a Hilbert space as possibly analogous to the lattice of sets that is closely related
to classical logic. Mackey (1957) pursued that analogy into measure theory by proposing
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that a measure could be defined as a function on the elements of any lattice, not just on
a lattice of sets. The key idea is that in Kolmogorov’s additivity condition (A.8) for the
definition of a probability measure, the provision A(i) ∧ A(j) =  could just as well have
been written as A(i) ≤ ¬A(j), where ≤ denotes set inclusion or logical implication. In set
theory, the two statements are equivalent. But in a general (non-Boolean) lattice, with 
replaced by ⊥b, they are not, as we have seen in the previous subsection when the lattice
is taken to be LH. The first statement, then, which in the non-Boolean case we write as
A(i) ∧q A(j) = , is what we are calling ‘disjointness’ of the subspaces, and the second is
orthogonality A(i) ⊥ A(j) (we write ⊥ without a q subscript since it is defined directly in
terms of an inner product of vectors). Some authors take ‘disjoint’ to mean ‘orthogonal’,
even when speaking of subspaces, which we consider a waste of a good adjective.
Mackey proposes to write Kolmogorov’s additivity condition Eq.(A.8) as
P(A(1) ∨ A(2) ∨ ...) = P(A(1)) + P(A(2)) + ...,when A(i) ⊥ A(j) for i 6= j. (B.20)
In this form, with A ⊥ B taken to mean A ≤ ¬B, he generalizes it to all lattices, and in
particular to LH . The relation A ⊥ B thus defined turns out in LH to be orthogonality of
subspaces defined in the usual way. (We note that this relation is symmetric.)
Specializing to LH, we follow Mackey in defining a lattice measure W as satisfying the
q-version of (B.20), namely
W(A(1) ∨q A(2) ∨q ...) =W(A(1)) +W(A(2)) + ...,when A(i) ⊥ A(j) for i 6= j. (B.21)
A normalized lattice measure W on a lattice L is a function from members of L to nonneg-
ative real numbers, satisfying (B.21) and in addition, mapping the >t element of L into 1
(and therefore the ⊥b element into 0). Since we shall only be interested in lattice measures
on LH, it is H that is mapped into 1 and O into 0. We shall never be concerned with a
classical measure on H itself; that would be a function on all subsets of H. (In Appendix
C, a similar treatment will be applied to HN , the N -fold tensor product of H with itself,
instead of to H.)
Mackey does not use the term ‘lattice measure’, but rather ‘measure on the questions’;
his term ‘question’ is defined to be what we call ‘projector’. Since subspaces are in 1-1 cor-
respondence with projectors, one may as well speak of a normalized measure on projectors,
defined as a function W from projectors to real nonnegative numbers, mapping the projector
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I (the identity operator on H) to the number 1 and satisfying
W ([A(1)]+[A(2)]+...) = W ([A(1)])+W ([A(2)])+..., when [A(i)][A(j)] = 0 for i 6= j. (B.22)
The span on A in (B.21) has been replaced by a sum on [A] in (B.22), which is correct
when the A’s are mutually orthogonal, and the provision A(i) ⊥ A(j) has been replaced by
[A(i)][A(j)] = 0. Note that these replacements would not work if in (B.21) we had written
A(i) ∧q A(j) = ⊥b instead of A(i) ⊥ A(j). The connection between (B.21) and (B.22) is
rendered explicit by setting
W ([A]) =W(A), (B.23)
where we use a script letter for a function on properties and a Roman letter for a function
on the corresponding projector.
Since (B.21) is defined entirely in terms of lattice operations, its meaning does not depend
on being able to interpret the lattice elements as sets. A certain confusion may arise (and
should be avoided) from the fact that in the case of LH the lattice elements actually are
sets of vectors in H. Even though we have used set inclusion in this sense to define the
lattice ordering relation A ≤ B, from which all other lattice relations are deduced, a ‘lattice
measure’ satisfying the condition (B.21) is not a function on arbitrary sets of vectors, but
only on subspaces treated as lattice elements. Therefore it is not a measure onH in the usual
sense. For this reason, mathematicians who have long been accustomed to understanding a
measure as a function on sets may resist the application of the term ‘measure’ to a function
on subspaces, or on projectors as in (B.22). We point out, though, that this resistance
might have been considerably diminished if Kolmogorov’s additivity condition for classical
measures had traditionally been expressed in terms of A(i) ⊆ ¬A(j) instead of A(i)∧A(j) = ,
as it perfectly well could have been.
Do there exist functions W as described above? One sees that (B.22) is just a linearity
condition, but restricted to orthogonal projectors. Now, of course there exist functions W˜
from all linear operators Aˆ on H to complex numbers that satisfy an ordinary linearity
condition, namely
W˜ (λ1Aˆ1 + λ2Aˆ2) = λ1W˜ (Aˆ1) + λ2W˜ (Aˆ2), (B.24)
where the λi are complex scalars, and in addition give real values to self-adjoint operators
and map the identity operator to 1. Such functions can always be written as Aˆ→ Tr(ρAˆ),
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where the information coded by W˜ is now contained in a positive (i.e., all expectation values
are ≥ 0) self-adjoint operator ρ of unit trace. In physics such an operator is called a density
matrix, but if one does not wish to call attention to a specific basis one may call it a density
operator. We shall use the former term.
For any fixed density matrix ρ, let us define the function
W˜ρ(Aˆ) = Tr(ρAˆ), (B.25)
where Aˆ is any linear operator in the Hilbert space. The restriction of W˜ρ to projectors
Aˆ = [A] yields a function Wρ from projectors to nonnegative real numbers, satisfying (B.22),
and consequently a normalized lattice measure Wρ on LH, defined by (B.23), that satisfies
Eq.(B.21).
Mackey then asked whether (B.22) has solutions not of the form (B.25). This question
was answered in the negative by Gleason (1957), who proved a difficult and celebrated
theorem named after him. Gleason’s Theorem tells us that with the exception of H having
dimension 2, all normalized lattice measures on LH are of the form A → Tr(ρ[A]) where
ρ is some density matrix. We shall ignore the exception, although counterexamples do
exist (Bell, 1966), and simply exclude such counterexamples from consideration as lattice
measures.
B.5. Probability and noncontextuality
We now apply the Mackey-Gleason ideas to our problem as stated at the beginning of
B.4: how can the choice of probability values for the atoms of each static framework be
constrained to satisfy noncontextuality, i.e. so that any subspace of H (any property) will
have the same probability value in every static framework of which it is a member? The
answer is given in terms of normalized lattice measures as defined in B.4.
Let us first recall that in Appendix B.2 we represented the members of a sample space S
by indices i belonging to a classical set J . The events E, defined in (B.9) in terms of subsets
J of J , are thus correlated with subsets of S. But S is itself a perfectly good classical set,
although its members are quantum mechanical beables. Therefore the proofs of Theorems
B1 and B2 might have been given directly in terms of subsets of S instead of subsets of
J . We found, however that the presentation was clearer in the ‘J-language’ than in the
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‘S-language’. Presently, though, we shall deal with arguments for which the ‘S-language’
works better. (We are aware of the fact that the symbols for the set (script) S and its subsets
(Roman) S are quite close in appearance and could be confused, especially when they occur
in subscripts, but we have run out of convenient notations and we trust that the context
will allow the reader to distinguish between the two symbols. In particular, subscripts for
the probability function P are always (script) S and those for events E are (Roman) S).
Corresponding to S there is a subspace ES defined as (∨q)D∈SD, which is a transcription
of (B.9) to the S-language. This definition is noncontextual: given only the set S, then ES
is determined uniquely, independent of S. However, the inverse relation is contextual: the
notation SE has only the meaning that SE is the unique subset S of S such that ES = E.
Thus one must know both E and S, to determine S. Strictly, we should write SE,S .
Theorem B4: Any normalized lattice measure acting on all of LH will yield a noncon-
textual network of probability functions on the various static frameworks.
Proof: Let Wρ be such a normalized lattice measure, and let S be a sample space. As ρ is
to remain fixed in what follows, we shall omit the subscript ρ. Let PS be the restriction ofW
to the static framework LS . Then PS is essentially a function on subsets S of S. Formally,
PS(S) = PE(S) =W(ES), (B.26)
where we have labelled the probability function either with the subscript S designating the
sample space or with the subscript E designating the corresponding framework, since the
two are in one to one correspondence. If any two subsets S and S ′ are disjoint in the classical
sense, S ∩ S ′ = , then (since S is a sample space) ES ⊥ E ′S′ . Therefore, if S(1), S(2),... are
any finite or countably infinite list of mutually disjoint subsets, we have from (B.21)
W(ES(1) ∨q ES(2) ∨q ...) =W(ES(1)) +W(ES(2)) + ... . (B.27)
But part (iv) of the proof of Theorem B1 tells us (replacing J ’s by S’s) that
(∨q)k(ES(k)) = E∪k(S(k)), (B.28)
where k = 1, 2, ..., so that (B.27) becomes
W(ES(1)∪S(2)∪...) =W(ES(1)) +W(ES(2)) + ... . (B.29)
Applying (B.26) we have
PS(S(1) ∪ S(2) ∪ ...) = PS(S(1)) + PS(S(2)) + ..., when S(i) ∩ S(j) =  for i 6= j. (B.30)
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But this is just (A.8) with S replacing A, and since W is normalized, (A.9) holds with S
replacing Ω. Therefore PS is a classical probability function on S. Hence by restricting W ,
in the manner described, to each static framework ES , one obtains a network of classical
probability functions. The values of these probability functions are noncontextual since the
right-hand side of (B.26) does not depend on S. This proves Theorem B4. We now prove
its converse.
Theorem B5: Suppose that we are given a noncontextual network of probability func-
tions belonging to the static frameworks of LH. This means that for each sample space S a
classical probability function PS is defined as acting on the subspaces in LS , or equivalently
on the subsets S of S, such that the values of the PS ’s are noncontextual; that is, if S, S ′
are respectively subsets of S, S ′ such that ES = E ′S′ , then PS(S) = PS′(S ′). Under these
conditions, says the theorem, there exists a normalized lattice measure W such that each
PS is given by (B.26).
Proof: If A is any subspace of H, we can define a sample space SA = {A,¬qA} and let
W(A) = PSA({A}). WithW defined in this way for every A, it follows that (B.26) will hold
for any S and any subset S of S. Indeed, let us consider two sample spaces, the first being S
and the second S ′ = SA where A = ES. Then A is an event in both associated frameworks
LS and LS′ , and if we let S ′ = {A} (the set of subspaces whose only member is A), then
ES′ = A also, so by noncontextuality PS(S) = PS′(S ′) = PSA({A}) = W(A) = W(ES),
which is just (B.26).
To show that W so defined is a lattice measure, we suppose that the events A(1), A(2),
... are all orthogonal. Then we must show that (B.21) holds. Let Atot = A(1) ∨q A(2) ∨q ...
and A0 = ¬qAtot. Then S = {A(0), A(1), A(2), ...} is a sample space. Therefore a probability
function PS exists and satisfies (B.30) for any list of (classically) disjoint subsets of S. Define
S(k) = {A(k)} for k = 1, 2, ...., and Stot = {A(1), A(2), ...}; then EStot = Atot and ES(k) = A(k)
for each k. Hence by (B.26), we have W(Atot) = PS(Stot), and W(A(k)) = PS(S(k)) for each
k. Consequently (B.30) becomes
W(Atot) =W(A(1)) +W(A(2)) + ... , (B.31)
which is just (B.21). Finally we observe that (B.26), applied to S = {H,} and S = {H},
yields W(H) = PS(S) = PS(H) = 1, so that W is normalized. This completes the proof.
Putting Theorem B5 together with Gleason’s Theorem, we infer that any network of
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probability functions with noncontextual values must be (disregarding the exception in 2
dimensions) the restriction to the various static frameworks of a function of the form
Wρ(A) = Tr(ρ[A]), (B.32)
for some density matrix ρ, which we refer to as the ‘state’ of the system (see below). Hence,
if we want the probability functions on all the frameworks to form a noncontextual network,
they must be given by
Pρ,S(A) = Pρ,E(A) = Tr(ρ[A]), forA ∈ E , (B.33)
where E is any framework containing A (either as a member of the sample space S or as
a compound event) and ρ is a single density matrix applying to all frameworks. Equation
(B.20) will still be satisfied because of the linearity of (B.33). (This equation should be
compared with (14) in the text.)
Although Wρ and Pρ,S have the same value wherever their domains overlap, each has
properties the other lacks: Wρ is defined over LH whereas any Pρ,S is defined only for a par-
ticular sublattice, and on the other hand Pρ,S satisfies certain rules such as the Kolmogorov
overlap equation (A.10) everywhere in its domain, while Wρ violates that equation when
applied to two incompatible subspaces.
B.6. States, truth values and probability values
In Section II we suggested that classical properties (subsets of phase space) can be re-
garded as predicates of propositions of which the phase point x is the subject. The subsets
are then given the truth value 1 if x ∈ A and 0 if not, which makes the point x the source
of truth for properties. To carry the procedure over to QM, we might wish to make the
state analogous to the phase point x, and the subspaces A analogous to the Borel subsets
of classical phase space. To discuss truth values we would then represent a state by a wave
function (normalized ket) |ψ〉, which we could consider as the ‘source of truth’. We have
seen above, however, that to discuss probabilities we must represent a state by a density
matrix ρ, in accordance with (B.32) and (B.33). To blend these two approaches, we proceed
as follows:
We generalize the Hilbert space ontology of Sec. IV.A and represent the quantum state
by a density operator ρ, which is a basic input to the theory, just as the state x (or its
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probabilistic counterpart ρ) is an input to classical mechanics. In the special case of a pure
state, where the density operator has a single nonzero eigenvalue (which must be equal to
unity), we designate the corresponding eigenvector by ψ and write it as |ψ〉. The density
operator can then be expressed in terms of the projector
ρ = ρψ = |ψ〉〈ψ|, (B.34)
which could also be written as [ψ]. Then (B.32) becomes
Wρψ(A) = 〈ψ|[A]||ψ〉, (B.35)
and similarly (B.33). In particular any property A satisfying [A]|ψ〉 = |ψ〉 is given probability
1, and those projectors that annihilate |ψ〉 have probability 0. But probabilities of 1 and 0
imply truth values T and F respectively. Thus, for pure states the density operator yields
truth values for particular properties (those compatible with [ψ]), that are the same as the
truth values inferred by taking |ψ〉 as primary and making it the source of truth. These
limited assignments of truth values do not violate no-go theorems because other properties
have only probability values, not truth values.
Appendix C: Families, Histories, Frameworks, and Probabilities
In this appendix we shall furnish the details of extending CQT from the static case to a
sequence of times.
C.1. Histories and families
We define a history of length N as a set
CN = (B1, B2, ...., BN) (C.1)
of properties (subspaces ofH), to be associated with an ordered sequence of times t1, t2, ..., tN .
A family FN of length N is a set of entities, referred to as dynamic events, which will turn
out to be either histories (the homogeneous events) or history complexes (the inhomoge-
neous events). They are generated by the elementary histories of the family, which are a
set of histories obtained in the following way: (This construction is the same as given in
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Subsection IV.B.1 of the text, after (15), except that here we go into detail. We revert now
to our usual practice of using the letter A, rather than D as in Appendix B, for members of
a static sample space.)
At each time tn we choose a sample space in the sense of Appendix B, that is a set
{An} = {A1n, A2n, ..., Amnn } of mutually orthogonal subspaces, which together span H. We
have denoted bymn the number of subspaces in {An}; eachmn may be either finite or infinite.
The set {An} also corresponds to a set {[An]} of projectors, which forms an orthogonal
decomposition of the identity operator on H, that is relevant to the time t = tn. The
elementary events of FN , henceforth also referred to as elementary histories, are obtained
by selecting from each sample space {An} a particular member Ajnn , where 1 ≤ jn ≤ mn.
One thereby forms a particular history
C
{j}
N = (A
j1
1 , ..., A
jN
N ), (C.2)
which we call an elementary history of FN . (We denote by j the sequence j1, ..., jN .) Clearly
the family has M elementary histories, where M(FN) = ΠN1 mn if all the mn are finite.
To construct the whole family, we imagine that each time tn is associated with a separate
copy of H. Then an elementary member C{j}N of FN may be regarded as a subspace of HN ,
the N ’th tensor product of H with itself. These M subspaces are mutually orthogonal and
together they span HN . Thus they form a sample space SN in HN , and their projectors
[Aj11 ]× [Aj22 ]× ...× [AjNN ] are an orthogonal decomposition of the identity in HN . The family
FN is then the event space, as defined in Appendix B.3, of SN , and by Theorem B1, applied
now to HN , it is also the lattice closure. We see that FN is determined by the choice of the
N sample spaces {An}. As in Subsection IV.C, we call the members of SN dynamic events,
as opposed to the individual projectors [Ajnn ], which are static events.
As in Appendix B, the events of the family FN correspond 1-1 with the subsets J of its
M elementary histories. Therefore they are subject to a ‘property calculus’ obtained by the
replacements (B.1), and each event can also be represented by a projection operator
[CJN ] =
∑
j∈J
[CjN ] =
∑
j∈J
[Aj11 ]× [Aj22 ]× ...× [AjNN ]. (C.3)
In this way the property calculus can be replaced by algebraic operations involving projec-
tors. It is easily seen that the family FN has 2M events if M is finite. Of these, one event
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is the null history corresponding to the empty set, and M events, corresponding to the sets
containing just one member, are the elementary histories themselves. The remainder are
compound events or compound histories, obtained by taking the disjunction, represented by
the summation in (C.3), in the property calculus belonging to the tensor space HN .
We now observe that some dynamic events, given by (C.3), can be factored into the form
(C.1), where each Bn belongs to the static event space at time tn. These are homogeneous
events (terminology of Isham et al. (1994)) and we accept them as histories. They are not
all elementary histories, because Bn is not necessarily an elementary member of the static
event space, as are the Ajnn ’s in (C.2). Those events of FN that cannot be factored in this
way are inhomogeneous events and we call them history complexes rather than histories.
As an illustration, let N = 2, m1 = 3, m2 = 2, and let C2 = (A
2
1, A
1
2), C
′
2 = (A
3
1, A
1
2),
C ′′2 = (A
3
1, A
2
2). Then C2 ∨q C ′2 = (A21 ∨q A31, A12) is a nonelementary homogeneous event
with B1 = A
2
1 ∨q A31, B2 = A12, but C2 ∨q C ′′2 is inhomogeneous. In this family there are
M = 3 × 2 = 6 elementary histories (events) and altogether 26 = 64 dynamic events, of
which 23 × 22 = 8 × 4 = 32 are homogeneous. In general, for finite but not small N ,
m1, ....,mN , the Π
N
1 2
mn = 2M˜ homogeneous events of FN (including the elementary events
and the null event), where M˜ = ΣN1 mn, constitute only a small fraction of all the 2
M events,
where M = ΠN1 mn.
In identifying an elementary history of FN there are two steps at each time tn: the choice
of a static framework {An} and the selection of an index jn, which determines a subspace Ajnn
of H. The whole family is identified by the first step at each time. If we were talking about
measurement (but we are not) we could say that the first step is choosing what measurement
to make and the second is selecting a possible outcome. To continue that analogy, we might
let the choice of a measurement depend on the outcome of a prior measurement.
So here, it is in principle possible (see Griffiths (2002), Eq. (8.37)) to allow each choice
{An} to depend on the prior selections ji<n. Gell-Mann and Hartle (2007) have stressed the
importance of this option, called branch dependence, in cosmology. For simplicity we shall
exclude branch dependence in constructing families. (With branch dependence, the formula
for M would have to be discarded since the numbers mi could also depend on prehistory.) We
leave it to the interested reader to verify that all the reasoning to be presented in subsequent
parts of this Appendix would hold as well in the presence of branch dependence, although
the notation would be fearfully encumbered.
63
C.2. Projectors and probabilities
As mentioned above, the elementary histories of FN form a complete, mutually orthogonal
set in HN , i.e. a history sample space. The whole family corresponds 1-1 with subsets of this
set. Hence, treating HN as we have treated H, we can write q-logical operations within FN ,
which will turn out to be set operations (see Eqs.(B.15) and (B.16)). The atomic members
of FN are just its elementary histories (see Theorem B4).
As was done for H at the end of Appendix B.3, a classical probability function PN
can be defined on the elementary histories of FN by choosing any set of real nonnegative
numbers that sum to 1. The probabilities of compound events (homogeneous or not) are
then determined, in analogy to (B.20), by the relation
PN(CN ∨q C ′N ∨q C ′′N + ...) = PN(CN) + PN(C ′N) + PN(C ′′N) + ...., (C.4)
where the q-operations on the left-hand side of (C.4) refer to the q-logic relevant to HN . At
this point in Appendix B, we called the analogue of the family a ‘static framework’. Here,
however, FN does not yet qualify as a framework: there is an additional condition that will
be explained in Appendix C.4. In view of (C.3), Eq.(C.4) may be rewritten as
PN([CN ] + [C
′
N ] + [C
′′
N ] + ...) = PN([CN ]) + PN([C
′
N ]) + PN([C
′′
N ]) + ...., (C.5)
where, in analogy to the notation adopted in (B.23), we use (Roman) P for a function on
projectors and other operators and (script) P for a function on subspaces (properties). The
symbols PN([CN ]) and PN(CN) represent the same quantity.
So far nothing has been said that would prevent us from assigning arbitrary probabilities
to each elementary history, as long as they add up to 1, and determining the probabilities of
compound events by summation. We wish, however, to introduce noncontextual conditional
probabilities relating each time to those before. To do this, it will be advantageous to change
our perspective from regarding the successive bases {A1}, {A2}, ..., {AN} as belonging to
separate copies of H, to seeing them as existing together in the same Hilbert space, so that
the relationship of An to An+1 in the same history can be treated algebraically. For this
purpose it will be helpful to think of a history CN as built up step by step out of its initial
subhistories C1, C2,...,CN−1 rather than coming into being all at once. Let us review this
process.
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To form an elementary history CN ∈ FN , we choose N successive projection times t1 <
t2 < .... < tN , and select N projectors ([A1], ...., [AN ]) belonging to the respective static
sample spaces at these times. We also fix the state at a time t0 < t1. (Griffiths sometimes
regards the state as part of the history, but we do not.) We shall also need to represent
the time evolution of the state under the action of the Hamiltonian H. As explained in
Subsection B.6, the state of the system is in general described by a density matrix ρ, whose
time development between projection times is
d
dt
ρ(t) = i[ρ(t), H]. (C.6)
For the rest of this appendix, however, we shall restrict ourselves to the special case of a
pure state, described by a wave function, which we write as |ψ〉 (or simply as ψ), in which
case Eq.(C.6) becomes the Schroedinger equation
d
dt
|ψ(t)〉 = −iH|ψ(t)〉. (C.7)
This is closer to Griffiths’s own presentation and it is intended to make the equations more
transparent. Strictly speaking, this means that our proofs will thus apply only to the pure
state case, but it is a simple matter to generalize them by replacing (C.7) with (C.6). All
the reasoning, including variants and deeper comments, is unaffected by the change from
|ψ〉 to ρ.
Independently of the state evolution, in constructing an elementary history we suppose
that at each time tn>0 the system ‘has’ the property associated with [An]. This supposition
will of course receive a probability determined by the state and (if n > 1) the previous
[An′<n]. The evolution will then be followed through conditional probabilities at each tn
based on the supposition made for tn−1. It is as though there were a ‘collapse’ at each
projection time, but in the microscopic theory we have no physical collapse. There is only a
system of conditional probabilities mathematically resembling a sequence of collapses. For
any n = 1, .., N − 1, we have defined the subhistory Cn to be (A1, ...., An). By arresting
the procedure at tn we obtain a family Fn of length n, whose elementary histories are the
possible Cn’s.
The time evolution associated with an elementary history thus consists of a continuous
Schroedinger development given by (C.7), controlled by the Hamiltonian H, punctuated by
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projections at times tn. Fortunately the effect of (C.7) can be removed by a simple trans-
formation. It turns out that the properties [An] enter into probabilities through products
of the form [An]U(tn, tn−1)[An−1]...[A2]U(t2, t1)[A1]U(t1, t0), which can also be written as
U(tn, t0)A¯nA¯n−1...A¯2A¯1, where
A¯n ≡ U(tn, t0)−1[An]U(tn, t0), (C.8)
and
U(t, t′) = exp[−iH(t− t′)]. (C.9)
We shall also use the notation
C¯N = (A¯1, A¯2, ...., A¯N), (C.10)
for the same history CN , expressed in terms of the A¯n. (We shall freely switch between the
CN and the C¯N notations in this appendix.) All calculations can be done in terms of the
A¯n, which are also projectors since U(t, t
′) is unitary. We prefer, however, not to introduce
the subspaces associated with these projectors because they are physically artificial and
confusing to the intuition. The A¯n will be recognized as the projection operators that enter
into the ‘Heisenberg picture’ of QM. Our choice is to think physically in the ‘Schroedinger
picture’, where the subspaces (hence their projectors) are fixed in time and the wave function
evolves, but to calculate in the Heisenberg picture, using the projectors A¯n and the fixed
wave function |ψ0〉 = |ψ(t = t0)〉.
The relations among the terms family, homogeneous and inhomogeneous event, history
and history complex, elementary and nonelementary history, remain unchanged when we
replace the projectors [A] by their Heisenberg counterparts A¯, as do the ideas of tensor
products and addition of histories as in (C.5). The sequence of projectors (A¯1, ...), however,
has a special feature that will be essential to our reasoning. If two successive projectors
A¯n, A¯n+1 happen to be equal, then the second projection might as well not have happened
and the time tn+1 can be deleted from the history. (In the Schroedinger picture, we would
need to say that the system, supposed to have the property [An] at tn, evolves so as to
have the property [An+1] at tn+1.) We shall refer to this as redundancy of two equal A¯’s
in succession. The redundancy concept will enter into the argument behind Theorem C1,
which is a central part of the reasoning of the next part of this Appendix.
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C.3. The extended Born rule
In the static case the Born rule (B.33) for probabilities is linear in the projector, but
since it involves self-adjoint projectors it can equally well be written as
Pρ(A) = Tr(ρ[A]†[A]), (C.11)
where we have suppressed the subscript E indicating the framework. In the dynamic case,
according to Griffiths, it is (C.11) that provides the generalization of the probability formula.
Specifically, since the dynamic generalization of a property is a history, given the wave
function |ψ0〉 at t = t0 (corresponding to the density operator ρ0 = |ψ0〉〈ψ0|), Griffiths
assumes that the probability of an elementary history is given by the Born rule for histories
Pρ0,N(CN) = Tr(ρ0Cˆ†N CˆN) = 〈ψ0|Cˆ†N CˆN |ψ0〉, (C.12)
where the chain operator
CˆN = U(tN , t0)[AN ]U(tN , tN−1)[AN−1]...[A2]U(t2, t1)[A1]U(t1, t0) (C.13)
is a single operator acting on H, not a sequence of subspaces like CN , or an operator on HN
like [CjN ] defined in Eq. (C.3). In view of (C.8) and (C.10), the chain operator can also be
written in terms of the Heisenberg projectors as
CˆN = A¯N A¯N−1...A¯2A¯1. (C.14)
We shall usually suppress the subscript ρ0 of (C.12) in writing probability functions.
Derivation of the extended Born rule (C.12)
It is our intention in this part of the Appendix to derive Eq.(C.12) for elementary histories
of FN , rather than postulating it. The function PN will then be determined on all of FN
by (C.4). In the next subsection we shall present an additional derivation proving (C.12)
for nonelementary histories. This will raise the danger of a contradiction with the values of
PN already determined by (C.4). To avoid such a contradiction, one must impose Griffiths’s
‘consistency condition’, which also involves the wave function. Only if this condition is
satisfied may the pair (ψ,FN) be called a framework.
Let us discuss first a family of length N = 1. The determination of a probability func-
tion on the sample space {A¯11, ..., A¯m11 } is to be accomplished through an interplay of the
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(Heisenberg) properties associated with t1 and the wave function associated with t0. Pro-
ceeding in accord with Subsection IV.B, we wish the values of this probability function to
be noncontextual. This implies, because of Gleason’s Theorem, that it should be obtained
by restriction from a normalized lattice measure over all of LH. This measure must be in-
dependent of the choice of a system of projectors at t1 and it must therefore be determined
by the wave function |ψ0〉 alone. For this reason we call the measure W0 and consider it
as belonging to the time t0, although the process of restricting it to a probability function
belongs to the time t1, since that is when the sample space of projectors is chosen. Now we
proceed as in Appendix B to obtain
W0(Bˆ) = 〈ψ0|Bˆ|ψ0〉, (C.15)
for any projector Bˆ ∈ LH. At t1 we choose the particular sample space of projectors
{A¯1} = {A¯11, ..., A¯m11 } and deduce that the probabilities of the different A¯j11 are given by the
restriction of W0, that is
P1(A¯
j1
1 ) = W0(A¯
j1
1 ) = 〈ψ0|A¯j11 |ψ0〉. (C.16)
The function P1 can now be understood as the classical probability function associated with
the family {A¯1} of length 1. It is defined for general events of the family by the summation
rule (C.4). Its sum over elementary events is 1 because W0 is normalized.
It should be understood that the reasoning leading to (C.15) and (C.16) is the same
single-time reasoning that was used in Appendix B. The artificial separation between two
times t0 and t1 is introduced only in order to display analogy between the step at n = 1
and the later steps involving conditional probabilities. The confrontation between state and
projector takes place at the single time t1; the state then is the same (in the Heisenberg
picture) as it was at t0.
Now we consider N > 1. At time tn−1 (with n ≤ N) there exists an elementary history
C¯n−1 = (A¯
j1
1 , ...., A¯
jn−1
n−1 ), reflecting all the selections from sample spaces chosen at times
t1, ..., tn−1. With respect to tn or to C¯n, we may call C¯n−1 a prehistory, i.e. it is the
subhistory of a subhistory. Given this prehistory, there must be a conditional probability
distribution governing the selection of A¯jnn out of the sample space chosen at tn. Since the
selection of A¯jnn is determined by the selection of jn, we shall abbreviate notation by writing
the conditional probability as QC¯n−1,{A¯n}(jn), where {A¯n} denotes the whole sample space
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{A¯1n, ..., A¯mnn } at tn. The probability of the whole history Cn = (Aj11 , ...., Ajnn ) must then be
given by
Pn(Cn) = QC¯n−1,{A¯n}(jn)Pn−1(Cn−1). (C.17)
Of course Q is required to be normalized: Σj=1,mnQC¯n−1,{A¯n}(jn) = 1, so that the normal-
ization of Pn will follow from that of Pn−1.
Nistico` (1999) has introduced the important idea that the conditional probability values
themselves should be noncontextual, with respect to the sample space at tn. That is, if {A¯′n}
is an alternative sample space {A¯′1n, ...A¯′m
′
n
n }, and A¯jn = A¯′ j
′
n for a particular pair (j, j
′), then
we must have QC¯n−1,{A¯n}(j) = QC¯n−1,{A¯′n}(j
′). Note that the same prehistory C¯n−1 appears
on both sides of this equation.
As in the static theory, the consequence of the values of Q being noncontextual (remember
that the argument j stands for the projector A¯j) is that Q must be the restriction of a
normalized measure on all projectors in LH. Since this measure does not have to do with
the choice of a sample space at tn, we associate it with the time tn−1 and call it ZC¯n−1 ,
dropping the subscript {A¯n}. Equation(C.17) now becomes
Pn(Cn) = ZC¯n−1(A¯jnn )Pn−1(Cn−1). (C.18)
For convenience let us think of C¯0 as the unique history of zero length, and define
ZC¯0 = W0, P0(C0) = 1. (C.19)
Then the first equality of (C.16) becomes a special case of (C.18), so that the latter is now
established for n = 1 as well as for higher n. We shall usually drop the superscript jn on the
right-hand side of (C.18) since the selection of A¯jnn from the n’th sample space is implied
by the history Cn on the left-hand side. From the point of view of the candidate framework
which includes the state as the ‘zero’th’ member, we may regard C0 as a ‘prehistory’ inherited
from time t0, and ZC¯0 as the conditional probability of C1, conditioned on the state.
At this stage it is important to note that CˆN is not in general a projection operator, so
that it is problematic to derive the quadratic relation (C.12) from Gleason’s Theorem, which
is linear in the projector. The program suggested by Nistico` (1999) is to construct such a
derivation using (C.18). In our derivation only the single-time version of Gleason’s Theorem
will be used in proving Theorem C3, once (above) at t1 and again at each subsequent time.
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We first infer from (C.18) a recursion relation involving only the Z’s, as expressed in the
following theorem:
Theorem C1: Consider an elementary history CN ∈ FN . Write CN as (A1, ..., AN),
dropping the superscripts jn. For 1 ≤ n < N , if Bˆ is any projector ≤ A¯n, then
ZC¯n(Bˆ) =
ZC¯n−1(Bˆ)
ZC¯n−1(A¯n)
. (C.20)
Proof: Let 1 ≤ n < N and consider a projector Bˆ ≤ A¯n. We can form a history C¯ ′n+1 =
(C¯n, Bˆ) = (A¯1, ..., A¯n, Bˆ). Since Bˆ need not belong to the sample space {A¯n+1}, C¯ ′n+1 does
not in general belong to Fn+1, the (n+ 1)st subfamily of FN , but its prehistory C¯n belongs
to Fn. For definiteness let us say that C¯ ′n+1 belongs to a family F ′n+1 which is identical
to Fn+1, except that in F ′n+1 the sample space {A¯n+1} is replaced by {A¯′n+1}, a refinement
of {A¯n} in which the two projectors Bˆ and A¯n − Bˆ are substituted for A¯n. (Recall that
Bˆ ≤ A¯n.) Then P ′n+1 is a valid probability function, and by a double application of (C.18),
we obtain
P ′n+1(C ′n+1) = ZC¯n(Bˆ)ZC¯n−1(A¯n)Pn−1(Cn−1), (C.21)
where the history C¯ ′n+1 can be written as (C¯n, Bˆ) or equivalently as (C¯n−1, A¯n, Bˆ).
On the other hand, F ′n+1 contains a compound (i.e., nonelementary) history (C¯n, A¯n),
the disjunction of (C¯n, Bˆ) with (C¯n, A¯n − Bˆ). Therefore, since Bˆ ≤ A¯n, the selection of Bˆ
out of the sample space {A¯′n+1} in forming C¯ ′n+1 can be viewed in two steps: first select A¯n,
then from within {A¯n} select Bˆ. But the first step is redundant with the selection of A¯n at
tn. Therefore the selection at tn can be dropped, and C¯
′
n+1 is equivalent to (C¯n−1, Bˆ) with Bˆ
occurring at tn+1. It follows that in (C.18) we may replace the left-hand side by P ′n+1(C ′n+1),
while retaining n− 1 on the right-hand side but replacing A¯jnn with Bˆ. We thus obtain
P ′n+1(C ′n+1) = ZC¯n−1(Bˆ)Pn−1(Cn−1). (C.22)
As the left sides of (C.21) and (C.22) are identical, we may equate the right sides and drop
the common factor Pn−1(Cn−1). After rearrangement one obtains (C.20). Theorem C1 is
proved.
We now introduce an important theorem due to Cassinelli and Zanghi (1983), Theorem
C2 below. Let V and W be any two measures on the projectors in LH (see (B.22)). Let Aˆ be
a fixed nonzero projector. Let us say that ‘W quot(Aˆ) V ’ iff for every projector Bˆ ≤ Aˆ, we
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have W (Bˆ) = V (Bˆ)/V (Aˆ). Let V˜ be the unique function defined from all linear operators
on H to complex numbers, whose restriction to projectors is V , and which possesses the
properties attributed to W˜ in (B.24). (The existence and uniqueness of V˜ are guaranteed
by Gleason’s Theorem.)
Theorem C2: The condition W quot(Aˆ) V implies that
W (Bˆ) =
V˜ (AˆBˆAˆ)
V (Aˆ)
, (C.23)
for all projectors Bˆ. [Note that (C.23) determines W (Bˆ) for all projectors Bˆ, although the
condition W quot(Aˆ) V without the theorem determines it only for Bˆ ≤ Aˆ, in which case
AˆBˆAˆ = Bˆ.]
It is through this theorem that the quadratic dependence on CˆN in (C.12) will come
about. (A simplified proof of Theorem C2 for a restricted case will be given in Appendix
D.) Using this theorem we are able to solve the recursion relation (C.20) by proving:
Theorem C3: For 0 ≤ n < N , the projector measure ZC¯n is given by
ZC¯n(Bˆ) =
〈ψ0|Cˆ†nBˆCˆn|ψ0〉
〈ψ0|Cˆ†nCˆn|ψ0〉
, (C.24)
for all projectors Bˆ ∈ LH. (Cˆn is the result of replacing N by n in (C.14); Cˆ0 = 1.)
Proof by induction on n (the following argument follows the reasoning of Nistico` (1999)
with some changes of detail):
Initial step: let n = 0. Then replacing Cˆ0 by 1, (C.24) becomes
ZC¯0(Bˆ) = 〈ψ0|Bˆ|ψ0〉, (C.25)
which follows from (C.19) and (C.15).
Induction step: For all 0 < n ≤ N , define
Vn(Bˆ) = 〈ψ0|Cˆ†n−1BˆCˆn−1|ψ0〉, (C.26)
and
Wn(Bˆ) = ZC¯n(Bˆ), (C.27)
for all projectors Bˆ in LH. (Formally (C.27) is an extension of (C.19), but that equation
furnished the definition of ZC¯0 whereas (C.27) defines Wn. The extension is unambiguous
71
within this proof, because Theorem C3 pertains to only one full history C¯N so that for each
n there is only one subhistory C¯n.)
Assume that (C.24) holds when n is replaced by n− 1. That is,
ZC¯n−1(Bˆ) =
〈ψ0|Cˆ†n−1BˆCˆn−1|ψ0〉
〈ψ0|Cˆ†n−1Cˆn−1|ψ0〉
. (C.28)
Since (C.28) holds for all projectors Bˆ, it holds with Aˆn in place of Bˆ. But this replacement
does not affect the denominator; therefore
ZC¯n−1(Bˆ)
ZC¯n−1(A¯n)
=
〈ψ0|Cˆ†n−1BˆCˆn−1|ψ0〉
〈ψ0|Cˆ†n−1A¯nCˆn−1|ψ0〉
=
Vn(Bˆ)
Vn(A¯n)
, (C.29)
as defined in (C.26). We now recall Theorem C1: Eq.(C.20) holds for all projectors Bˆ ≤ A¯n.
But in view of (C.27) and (C.29), (C.20) becomes
Wn(Bˆ) =
Vn(Bˆ)
Vn(A¯n)
, (C.30)
so that Theorem C1 says that (C.30) holds for all projectors Bˆ ≤ A¯n.
Now, Vn is easily seen to be a measure on projectors, but not necessarily normalized. By
Gleason’s Theorem, Vn is the restriction to projectors of a function V˜n, which can only have
the form
V˜n(Jˆ) = 〈ψ0|Cˆ†n−1JˆCˆn−1|ψ0〉, (C.31)
for arbitrary operators Jˆ acting on H. Looking at (C.30), we see that the assertion of
Theorem C1 is exactly the condition
Wn quot(A¯n) Vn, (C.32)
required by Theorem C2. Therefore the conclusion of Theorem C2,
Wn(Bˆ) =
V˜n(A¯nBˆA¯n)
Vn(A¯n)
, (C.33)
is established. Finally, we substitute A¯n for Bˆ in (C.26), and use the fact that
A¯n = A¯
2
n = A¯
†
nA¯n and A¯nCˆn−1 = Cˆn, obtaining
Vn(A¯n) = 〈ψ0|Cˆ†nCˆn|ψ0〉. (C.34)
We also substitute A¯nBˆA¯n for Jˆ in (C.31) to obtain
V˜n(A¯nBˆA¯n) = 〈ψ0|Cˆ†nBˆCˆn|ψ0〉, (C.35)
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since Cˆn = A¯nCˆn−1. Substituting (C.34) and (C.35) into (C.33), we have (C.24). We have
thus shown that (C.24) follows from (C.28). The proof by induction of Theorem C3 is
complete.
A word about the part played by (C.19) and (C.15) in Theorems C1 and C3. The
definition (C.19) is an artificial device that makes it possible, in Theorem C1, to allow n = 1
in (C.20), (C.21), (C.22). Otherwise the initial step in the proof of Theorem C3 would have
to be n = 1 and the induction would have to start with n = 2, making the proof more
unwieldy. The finding (C.15), on the other hand, is derived from our reasoning in the static
case (Appendix B.6) and forms an essential part of our approach to the ‘single-time’ case of
the Born rule.
Griffiths postulates the Born rule from the start, but we wish to derive it rather than
stating it didactically. Since the probability of a history is deduced from that of its immediate
prehistory via the conditional probability that relates them, the induction proof of Theorem
C3 extends the Born rule step by step to histories of arbitrary length; but there must be
a starting point, (C.15) or the corresponding equation with ρ rather than ψ, that does not
depend on conditional probability. To justify this starting point on the basis of the empirical
correctness of quantum mechanical predictions would sacrifice the important principle that
(in the ‘microscopic theory’ at least) the theory should be purely deductive and not refer to
actual measurements. Therefore (C.15) must be deduced, and this requires the appeal to
Gleason’s Theorem we make in Appendix B.6.
We are now able to prove Griffiths’s extended Born rule, (C.12), by substituting (C.24)
into the recursion (C.18).
Theorem C4: the probability of an elementary history of length N is given correctly
by (C.12).
Proof: Iterating (C.18), we find
PN(CN) = ZC¯N−1(A¯N−1)...ZC¯1(A¯1)P1(C1). (C.36)
Substituting A¯n+1 for Bˆ in (C.24), we have
ZC¯n(A¯n+1) =
〈ψ0|Cˆ†nA¯n+1Cˆn|ψ0〉
〈ψ|Cˆ†nCˆn|ψ0〉
=
〈ψ0|Cˆ†n+1Cˆn+1|ψ0〉
〈ψ|Cˆ†nCˆn|ψ0〉
, (C.37)
so that in (C.36) all the intermediate factors cancel and we are left with
PN(CN) = P1(C1) 〈ψ0|Cˆ
†
N CˆN |ψ0〉
〈ψ0|Cˆ†1Cˆ1|ψ0〉
, (C.38)
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which is identical to (C.12), in view of (C.16) and the fact that Cˆ1 = A¯
j1
1 = A¯1 is a projector.
We note that the content of Theorems C1-4 can be decomposed into two parts:
(a) For a given wave function |ψ0〉, the probability of a history CN is given by an expression
of the form D(CN , CN), where for any two histories Cα, Cα′ the expression D(α, α′), called
a decoherence functional, has certain algebraic properties.
(b) The decoherence functional referred to above has the specific formD(α, α′) = 〈ψ0|Cˆ†α′Cˆα|ψ0〉.
Isham et al. (1994), as well as Sorkin (1994) prove, effectively, that if (a) is assumed then
(b) follows. This is far short of proving both (a) and (b) from reasonable assumptions, which
is done here. In Subsec. IV.C of the text, however, we comment on the wider scope of these
papers, that goes beyond nonrelativistic QM.
C.4. Consistency: from families to frameworks
So far we have determined only the probabilities of those histories that are elementary
within a family. Let us take the simple example described in part 1 of this Appendix,
in which N = 2, m1 = 3, m2 = 2. There are 3 × 2 = 6 elementary histories. The
probabilities of compound events must be determined by summing those of the elementary
events composing them, as explained at the beginning of Appendix C.2. In our example, we
may let C¯2 = (A¯
2
1, A¯
1
2) and C¯
′′
2 = (A¯
3
1, A¯
2
2). Since any two elementary histories are disjoint,
(C.5) yields
P2(C¯2 ∨q C¯ ′′2 ) = P2(C¯2) + P2(C¯ ′′2 ). (C.39)
Likewise one may construct an event by disjunction (‘q-or’) from any subset of the set of 6
elementary histories. Altogether there are 26 = 64 such events in this family, including the 6
elementary histories constructed from a set with one event, and the null history constructed
from the empty set. The probability of any such event is the sum of the probabilities of
the elementary histories that make it up. In all of this reasoning there arises no problem of
consistency; all the probabilities identified so far are consistent.
Of particular interest, however, are those compound events that we have called homo-
geneous in Appendix C.1. We naturally identify compound homogeneous events as those
formed by disjunction as described above. As illustration, take again the family described
in the first paragraph above. Let a homogeneous event C¯B2 = (B¯1, B¯2) be chosen by letting
B¯1 = A¯
2
1 + A¯
3
1, B¯2 = A¯
1
2. Then B¯1 ‘says’ that either A¯
2
1 or A¯
3
1 is selected, and B¯2 ‘says’ that
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A¯12 is selected. In terms of the tensor space HN , we may say that C¯B2 = C¯2∨q C¯ ′2, that is, C¯B2
says that either C¯2 or C¯ ′2 is selected. Therefore the probability of C¯B2 is given in accordance
with (C.4) as
P2(C¯
B
2 ) = P2(C¯2) + P2(C¯
′
2) = 〈ψ0|A¯21A¯12A¯21|ψ0〉+ 〈ψ0|A¯31A¯12A¯31|ψ0〉, (C.40)
in accordance with (C.12). (We have contracted A¯12A¯
1
2 to A¯
1
2.) So far there is still no
inconsistency.
But suppose that we substitute the history C¯B¯2 = (B¯1, B¯2) directly into (C.12). We then
get
P2(C¯
B¯
2 ) = 〈ψ0|B¯1B¯2B¯1|ψ0〉 = 〈ψ0|(A¯21 + A¯31)A¯12(A¯21 + A¯31)|ψ0〉. (C.41)
Because of the quadratic nature of (C.12), Eq.(C.41) has four terms, two of which add up
to (C.40) and the other two are both equal to 〈ψ0|A¯21A¯12A¯31)|ψ0〉 (in more complicated cases
the two interference terms are conjugate so that their sum is always real). In order to ensure
that (C.41) will always agree with (C.40), Griffiths (2002) imposes a consistency condition
Re(〈ψ0|Cˆ†N Cˆ ′N |ψ0〉) = 0, (C.42)
where CˆN and Cˆ
′
N are the chain operators for any two distinct elementary histories. Only
under this additional condition, which involves the wave function as well as the histories,
does he admit that the pair (ψ0,FN) is a framework. Equation (C.42) is known as the ‘weak
decoherence’ condition.
But now we ask, why is it necessary for (C.40) and (C.41) to agree? Griffiths takes it for
granted that (C.12) should apply directly to any history whether elementary or not. But
we are deriving (C.12) rather than positing it, and we have derived it only for elementary
histories. Can we dispense with the consistency condition by simply disallowing (C.12)
unless the history is elementary?
We answer this question in the negative by another noncontextuality argument. Consider
a compound history C¯B¯N = (B¯1, ..., B¯N), belonging to the family we have described. For each
n, B¯n is the sum of some subset Xn of the projectors A¯
jn
n belonging to the sample space
at tn. Create a new family by deleting all members of Xn from the n
′th sample space and
replacing them by the single projector B¯n; do this at every n from 1 to N . This new family
is built up out of valid new sample spaces at each tn, and in it the history C¯
B¯
2 is elementary.
Therefore in the new family Eq.(C.12) applies and the probability of C¯B¯2 is given by (C.41).
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But the concept of noncontextuality requires that C¯B¯2 have the same probability value in
the new family as in the old. Therefore (C.41) must agree with (C.40), and in general we
must have (C.42). So we have derived the weak decoherence condition for frameworks quite
generally. (In Sec. IV.C of the text we discuss the more restrictive condition known as
‘medium decoherence’, which is widely considered to be necessary as well.)
If one takes it for granted that all the steps of induction (corresponding to our Theorems
C1 and C3), and therefore the final result (C.12), apply to all histories, then there is no
need for the argument in the preceding paragraph. We object, however, on the ground that
(as stressed by Griffiths) all true probabilities must arise from a probability function, which
can exist only in relation to a sample space. In our proof of Theorem C1, there are frequent
references to sample spaces. When one deals with a history that is not elementary, there
is no sample space and therefore the argument breaks down. This is why we consider it
necessary, as in the preceding paragraph, to introduce another, auxiliary, family, in which
the history under consideration is elementary, and to apply noncontextuality to the histories
in that family.
Appendix D: Limited proof of the CZ theorem
The theorem of Cassinelli and Zanghi (1983) (Theorem C2), as we use it, states: Let V
be a lattice measure on the projectors of H, and Aˆ a fixed nonzero projector. We seek a
normalized lattice measure W on the projectors such that for any projector Bˆ satisfying
Bˆ ≤ Aˆ, (D.1)
W satisfies
W (Bˆ) =
V (Bˆ)
V (Aˆ)
. (D.2)
Then the unique W satisfying (D.2) under the condition (D.1) is
W (Bˆ) =
V˜ (AˆBˆAˆ)
V (Aˆ)
, (D.3)
where V˜ is the linear extension of V given by Gleason’s Theorem, and (D.3) is asserted for
all projectors Bˆ.
Proof: It is trivial that (D.3) satisfies (D.2) given (D.1), since Aˆ = Bˆ when Bˆ ≤ Aˆ, and
that (D.3) describes a normalized lattice measure since the rhs is 1 when Bˆ = 1 and the
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additivity condition is guaranteed by V˜ being linear. Therefore the proof consists in showing
that if (D.2) holds for all Bˆ satisfying (D.1), then W must satisfy (D.3) for all projectors Bˆ.
Here we shall content ourselves with showing that W satisfies (D.3) for projectors Bˆ such
that:
the eigenvalues of AˆBˆAˆ form a discrete countable set. (D.4)
First we prove a lemma applicable to all projectors Bˆ, regardless of (D.1) or (D.4).
Lemma: for any projector Bˆ,
W (Bˆ) = W˜ (AˆBˆAˆ), (D.5)
where W˜ is the linear extension of W given by Gleason’s Theorem.
Proof: Define
Aˆ⊥ = 1− Aˆ. (D.6)
Since (Aˆ⊥)2 = 1− 2Aˆ+ Aˆ2 = 1− Aˆ = Aˆ⊥, Aˆ⊥ is a projector. By additivity of W˜ , we have
W˜ (Aˆ⊥) = W˜ (1)−W˜ (Aˆ). But W˜ (1) = 1 because W is normalized, and W˜ (Aˆ) = 1 by setting
Bˆ = Aˆ in (D.2). Therefore
W˜ (Aˆ⊥) = 0. (D.7)
Now, the linearity of W˜ implies that there exists a countable set of (unnormalized) vectors
|φi〉 such that for all operators Jˆ
W˜ (Jˆ) =
∑
i
〈φi|Jˆ |φi〉. (D.8)
Setting Jˆ = Aˆ⊥ in (D.8) and using (D.7), we have
0 =
∑
i
〈φi|Aˆ⊥|φi〉 =
∑
i
〈φi|Aˆ⊥Aˆ⊥|φi〉, (D.9)
where each term is real ≥ 0. It follows that
Aˆ⊥|φi〉 = 0, (D.10)
for every i. To complete the proof of the lemma, we note that Bˆ = (Aˆ + Aˆ⊥)Bˆ(Aˆ + Aˆ⊥)
and so
W˜ (Bˆ) = W˜ (AˆBˆAˆ) + W˜ (AˆBˆAˆ⊥) + W˜ (Aˆ⊥BˆAˆ) + W˜ (Aˆ⊥BˆAˆ⊥). (D.11)
Letting Jˆ in (D.8) be AˆBˆAˆ⊥, Aˆ⊥BˆAˆ, Aˆ⊥BˆAˆ⊥, in turn, we see from (D.10) that the last
three terms in (D.11) vanish, and the lemma is proved since W (Bˆ) = W˜ (Bˆ).
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We now introduce the condition (D.4). To each eigenvalue λi of AˆBˆAˆ there corresponds
an eigenspace whose projection operator may be called Pˆi, and we have
AˆBˆAˆ =
∑
i
λiPˆi, (D.12)
as well as
AˆBˆAˆPˆi = PˆiAˆBˆAˆ = λiPˆi, (D.13)
for each i. Consider any i for which λi 6= 0. Using (D.13) and Aˆ2 = Aˆ, we can write
PˆiAˆ = Pˆi(AˆBˆAˆ/λi)Aˆ = Pˆi(AˆBˆAˆ/λi) = Pˆi, (D.14)
and likewise
AˆPˆi = Pˆi. (D.15)
Thus (D.1) is satisfied by replacing Bˆ with Pˆi, and hence from (D.2)
W˜ (Pˆi) = W (Pˆi) =
V (Pˆi)
V (Aˆ)
=
V˜ (Pˆi)
V (Aˆ)
, (D.16)
provided that λi 6= 0. We now substitute (D.12) into (D.5), obtaining
W (Bˆ) =
∑
i
λiW˜ (Pˆi). (D.17)
If there is a λi = 0, the corresponding term contributes zero to (D.17), which can therefore
be written
W (Bˆ) =
λi 6=0∑
i
λiW˜ (Pˆi). (D.18)
Equation (D.16) can now be applied to each term of (D.18), yielding
W (Bˆ) =
∑λi 6=0
i λiV˜ (Pˆi)
V (Aˆ)
. (D.19)
But from (D.12), treating V˜ as we did W˜ , we also obtain
V˜ (AˆBˆAˆ) =
λi 6=0∑
i
λiV˜ (Pˆi). (D.20)
Comparing (D.20) to (D.19), we obtain (D.3), Q.E.D. If (D.4) is not assumed, the reasoning
from (D.12) to (D.20) must be replaced by a more difficult argument given by Cassinelli and
Zanghi (1983) using the spectral theorem.
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Appendix E: Glossary
• assertions: the set of correct statements a realistic theory makes about the objects in
the ontology, including statements of probability.
• atom, atomic: A is an atomic member of a lattice if there exists no nonzero B such
that B < A.
• beable: entity contained in the ontology. What a realistic theory is ‘about’.
• Boolean lattice: a lattice in which the distributive law (as well as the lattice axioms)
holds.
• Born rule: a formula for evaluating the probability of a property or a history, given
the state. In the present work it is sometimes referred to as the ‘microscopic’ Born
rule, in contrast to the ‘macroscopic’ Born rule giving probabilities for the outcomes
of measurement.
• branch dependence: a feature of a family in which the sample space chosen at each
time tn may depend on the prehistory selected up to tn−1.
• c-assertions (c-probability functions, c-truth): the set of correct but contextual state-
ments that can be made about quantum properties or histories within a single frame-
work.
• classical history: a history, all of whose properties are classical. Classical histories are
discretized trajectories in phase space.
• compatible frameworks: two (dynamic) frameworks are mutually compatible if their
states are mutually compatible and if in addition, each history in one framework is
compatible with all the histories in the other. Individual frameworks are internally
compatible by definition, since all the histories in a family are mutually compatible.
• compatible histories: two histories having the same projection times t1, ..., tN are (mu-
tually) compatible if for each n, the nth property of one history is compatible with
the nth property of the other.
79
• compatible properties: two quantum properties (subspaces) whose projectors com-
mute.
• Compatible Quantum Theory (CQT): the present realistic formulation of quantum me-
chanics that comprises a microscopic part (MIQM) and a macroscopic part (MAQM).
• compatible sublattice: a lattice of mutually compatible properties.
• compound property: a nonatomic member of the event space of a static framework.
• compound history: a homogeneous event that is nonatomic in the event space of a
family.
• consistency conditions: conditions of orthogonality (decoherence) between elementary
histories in a family. These conditions involve the state.
• Consistent Histories theory (CH): the original formulation of the histories approach
due to Griffiths and its later elaborations.
• contextual: framework dependent.
• decoherence: the physical mechanism by which properties of a quantum system lose
correlations with other properties through interactions with an environment.
• decoherence functional: a bilinear (hermitian) functional on histories in terms of which
the decoherence or consistency conditions for frameworks are expressed, and whose
diagonal part gives the quadratic Born rule.
• Decoherent Histories theory (DH): the version of the histories approach due to Gell-
Mann and Hartle that had the formulation of quantum cosmology as its primary
motivation. The approach considers an infinite system from the start, so that the
distinction between the microscopic and macroscopic theories does not appear natural
from this point of view. The formulation emphasizes the role of coarse graining and
decoherence (hence its name) in the emergence of classical properties and histories in
the macroscopic domain and in selecting physical frameworks.
• dynamic case: the description of a quantum system at a sequence of N times.
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• dynamic event: a member of the many-time event space in the dynamic case.
• elementary history of a family: a member of the sample space, i.e. a history formed
by selecting, at each of the projection times chosen for that family, one member of the
static framework chosen at that time.
• elementary property: a member of the one-time sample space, or equivalently an atom
of the lattice or framework.
• event: in probability theory, the argument of a probability function. In CQT, in the
static case, a property that belongs to a static framework, determined by a subset of
the sample space; in the dynamic case, a member of a family, determined by a subset
of the sample space.
• event algebra/event space: the set of all events that form the domain of a probability
function, i.e. a static framework of properties in the one-time case or a family of events
in the many-time case.
• family: a collection of many-time (dynamic) events generated algebraically by its
elementary histories. The events may be homogenous or inhomogeneous.
• framework: a static framework is a Boolean sublattice of the lattice of properties
in H whose elementary members (atoms) span H. A dynamic framework is a pair,
consisting of a state and a family, that satisfies consistency conditions.
• history: a generalization of a property to multiple times, obtained by considering one
property at each of a sequence of times. When considered as a member of a family, a
history is the same as a homogeneous event.
• history complex: a member of a family/event space that does not qualify as a history;
an inhomogeneous event.
• homogeneous event: a member of a family consisting of a time-ordered sequence of
properties. Some homogeneous events are elementary (the properties are atomic),
others are compound. The distinction elementary/compound applies also to histories
considered as members of a family.
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• inhomogeneous event: a member of a family that is not homogeneous; a history com-
plex.
• lattice: a partially ordered set satisfying additional properties spelled out in Appendix
A. Quantum properties in Hilbert space form a non-Boolean lattice.
• lattice measure: a function from quantum properties or histories to [0,∞] that satis-
fies a linearity condition like that of Kolmogorov, but with ‘exclusive’ interpreted as
‘orthogonal’ rather than ‘nonintersecting’.
• macroscopic: a macroscopic system is a large (ideally infinite) system.
• macroscopic quantum mechanics (MAQM): the part of CQT, pertaining to macro-
scopic systems which provides a mechanism for selecting a physical framework from
the multiplicity of incompatible frameworks appearing in MIQM.
• many-time case: equivalent to dynamic case.
• measure (classical): a function from subsets of some ‘universal’ set Ω to [0,∞], satis-
fying Kolmogorov’s additivity condition.
• measurement: a physical interaction between a system S and a classical measuring
device whose purpose is to determine the truth values of selected properties of S.
Measurements are defined only in MAQM.
• measurement problem: this problem, which arises in the orthodox formulation of
Subsec. V.B, concerns the explanation of wave function collapse.
• medium decoherence: a relation, involving the decoherence functional, which is re-
quired for the consistency of a framework.
• microscopic: a theory is microscopic if it applies to arbitrary closed systems, regardless
of size.
• noncontextual: framework independent.
• normalized lattice measure: a lattice measure that maps the whole Hilbert space into
1. Its range is therefore the unit interval.
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• ontology: the set of all the beables in a theory.
• operationalism (operationalist): a physical theory is said to be operationalist if in
describing a system S it requires entities external to S.
• physical framework selection: a mechanism for identifying, among all the mutually
incompatible frameworks of a closed quantum system, a particular framework that
incorporates physical truth and falsehood. The selection mechanism can be either ‘ex-
ternal’, via a classical measurement, or ‘internal’, constructed from a larger quantum
system of which the system under study is a subsystem.
• physical framework: a framework composed of physical histories.
• physical history: a history, whose initial properties are quantum mechanical and whose
final properties are classical.
• physical truth: the truth associated with the physical assertions, pertaining to the
selected physical framework.
• prehistory: a history consisting of the first n− 1 properties of a given subhistory Cn.
• probability function: a function p from a ‘universal’ set Ω (known as the sample space)
to the interval [0, 1], which maps Ω itself to 1. Such a function naturally induces a
function P from a field of subsets of Ω to [0, 1].
• projection operator/projector: a self-adjoint operator Jˆ that satisfies Jˆ2 = Jˆ . Any
such operator is uniquely associated with some subspace A according to the relation
Jˆ = [A] defined in the paper. Then we say that Jˆ is the projector of A.
• property: a classical property is a subset of phase space. A quantum property is a
subspace of Hilbert space. Quantum properties can be represented by their projectors.
• quantum state: same as state.
• real (reality): the term ‘real’ applied to a property or a state is ambiguous and is
avoided in our formulation of quantum mechanics. We prefer to speak of ‘true’ or
‘false’ properties.
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• realism (realistic): the formulation of a physical theory is realistic if in describing a
closed system S it uses only entities and concepts pertaining to S.
• sample space: in general, a set whose subsets may serve as arguments for a probability
function. In CQT, a set of orthogonal properties (subspaces) that span the whole
Hilbert space H, or a set of orthogonal events that span HN . The sample space
generates all the events in the event space.
• state: the mathematical representation of the system under study. For classical me-
chanics it is a point in phase space in the deterministic case and a probability distri-
bution over points in the stochastic case. For quantum mechanics it is a ray of vectors
in Hilbert space for pure states, and a density matrix for mixed states. The state is
the source of truth and of probability for properties and histories, which without the
state have neither truth nor probability values.
• static case: the description of a quantum system that does not take time dependence
into account. It is equivalent to the one-time (N = 1) dynamic case.
• subhistory: a history consisting of the first n properties of a history CN , with n < N .
• subspace: a subspace of a Hilbert space is a subset that is itself a Hilbert space.
• true/false (truth/falsehood): defined by a truth function.
• truth function: a function assigning a value 0 or 1 to each property or history in its
domain.
• weak decoherence: a necessary condition for the consistency of a framework, which
involves the decoherence functional.
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